Beyond Dirks: Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading by Nagy, Donna M
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
2016
Beyond Dirks: Gratuitous Tipping and Insider
Trading
Donna M. Nagy
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, dnagy@indiana.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Securities Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nagy, Donna M., "Beyond Dirks: Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading" (2016). Articles by Maurer Faculty. 2451.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2451
Beyond Dirks: Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading
Donna M. Nagy*
Did an investment banker who gratuitously shared material nonpublic information
with his brother, with no expectation of receiving anything in return, commit securities
fraud? And is the investment banker's brother-in-law jointly liable for trading securities
on the basis of what he knew to be gratuitous tips? The Supreme Court is poised to answer
those questions in Salman v. United States, after steering clear of insider trading law for
nearly two decades. It has been even longer still since the Court last addressed securities
fraud liability relating to stock trading tips-it articulated a "personal benefit" test for
joint tipper-tippee liability in 1983 in Dirks v. SEC, a decision reaffirming the "classical"
theory of insider trading. In 2015, a circuit split arose as to whether gratuitous tipping
constitutes a violation of the antifraud provisions in the federal securities laws, and the
Court has granted certiorari in Salman to resolve that issue. This Article disagrees with
the Second Circuit's finding that gratuitous tips do not result in a personal benefit and
supports the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that such tips are illegal. But in arguing that
gratuitous tips satisfy the personal benefit test, this Article draws from a potent
combination offourpost-Dirks developments in federal securities law and state corporate
law. These developments should prompt the Court not only to affirm the Ninth Circuit's
decision but also to look beyond Dirks either to replace the personal benefit test with a
breach of the duty of loyalty standard or, more boldly, to consolidate the Court's prior
complementary theories of insider trading liability-the classical and misappropriation
theories-into a unified and expanded framework that would regard insider trading as a
'fraud on contemporaneous traders."
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Beyond Dirks: Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading
I. INTRODUCTION
In the iconic 1983 film The Big Chill, Harold (played by Kevin Kline) provided a
stock trading tip to his long-time friend Nick, a Vietnam War veteran and former radio
psychologist turned drug dealer (William Hurt). During a morning jog, Harold told Nick
that a very large corporation was planning to buy his running shoe company, "Running
Dog," and that the company's stockholders would see their money tripled. Harold shared
this information in the hope that Nick would trade on it and then use the profits to get into
some other line of work. Harold bluntly acknowledged that his stock tip could get him into
big trouble because he was violating a host of federal securities laws. Later that evening,
Harold's wife Sarah (Glenn Close) chastised him for risking so much on a futile desire to
change people's lives. I
The three Second Circuit judges who overturned the defendants' insider trading
convictions in United States v. Newman 2 would likely disagree with Harold's assessment
of his wrongdoing. In the court's view, even if evidence establishes that a corporate insider
and his "tippee" are friends, disclosing inside information does not constitute securities
fraud absent proof that they had a "meaningfully close personal relationship" 3 and that the
insider expected some type of tangible benefit in exchange for the information. 4 The film
leaves little doubt that Harold and Nick shared a "meaningfully close personal
relationship." 5 Harold, however, neither sought nor received a tangible benefit. Instead, he
engaged in what can be termed "gratuitous tipping"-Harold gifted the confidential
corporate information so that Nick could benefit from using it in a securities transaction.
The common sense notion that gratuitous tipping violates insider trading law aligns
squarely with the Supreme Court's holding in Dirks v. SEC6 (which, as it happens, shares
the date of the movie-1983). Building on the "classical" theory developed three years
before in Chiarella v. United States,7 Dirks held that the disclosure of material nonpublic
information constitutes fraudulent tipping under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act 8 and Rule 1Ob-5 9 thereunder when the tipper breaches a fiduciary duty of trust and
confidence by personally benefitting (directly or indirectly) from the disclosure. Dirks held
further that a tippee's liability under Rule 1 Ob-5 derives from the tipper's liability, provided
the tippee knew or should have known about the tipper's breach.10 An insider's "personal
benefit" from a tip would include a quid pro quo producing "pecuniary gain or a
reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings."l 1 But Dirks stated explicitly
1. THE BIG CHILL (Columbia Pictures Corp. 1983). We know from the film that the tipping resulted in a
securities transaction: Harold also shared Running Dog's confidential information with Alex, another close friend
(whose tragic death reunited the seven college friends who gathered for his funeral). During their jog, Harold told
Nick that Alex had purchased Running Dog stock on the basis of his tip.
2. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
3. Id. at 452.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
7. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1934).
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951).
10. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.
11. Id. at 663.
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that "[t]he elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist
when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.",
12
Surreptitious gifts of confidential information can likewise originate from an
"outsider" to the corporation that issued the securities subject to a tip, as opposed to a
classical insider such as Harold. An unethical lawyer or accountant, for instance, could
breach a client's confidence to enable a friend or relative to profit mightily in the stock
market. 13 Gratuitous trading tips can also come from rogue employees who are privy to
market-sensitive developments that have yet to be announced publicly 14 or from persons
who secretly relay business-related confidences that have been entrusted to them by a
family member or friend. 15 Because such outsider scenarios involve a breach of the duty
of trust and confidence owed to the source of the entrusted information rather than to a
trading party, they are analyzed under the "complementary" misappropriation theory
endorsed by the Court in United States v. O'Hagan. 
16
The court in Newman evaded Dirks's reference to informational gifts because it
refused to view as a personal benefit the "ephemeral benefit of the 'value of [a tippee's]
friendship."' 17 Specifically, Newman's two-fold requirement of a "meaningfully close
personal relationship" 18 and "a personal benefit of... some consequence" 19 prompted the
court to reject the jury's finding that an investor relations official had personally benefitted
when he disclosed, on multiple occasions, his company's confidential earnings information
to a securities analyst, who had been his classmate in business school and a former
colleague. Newman likewise rejected the jury's finding regarding the personal benefit
received by a second tipper, an insider at a different corporation who repeatedly shared that
company's confidential earnings information with a family friend.
21
Since the Second Circuit decided Newman, its heightened standard for proving a
personal benefit has been impeding Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and
12. Id. at 664.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Gansman, 657 F.3d 85, 90-97 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming conviction under
Rule I Ob-5 where defendant-attorney illegally tipped his girlfriend about information pertaining to clients at Ernst
& Young); United States v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78, 84-87 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming conviction under Rule lOb-
5 where defendant-law firm associate both traded on the basis of confidential client information and tipped
relatives who subsequently traded).
14. See, e.g., SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 199-204 (2d Cir. 1984) (affirming tipper-defendant's liability
under Rule lOb-5 for his disclosure of information misappropriated from his printer-employer, even though there
was insufficient proof that tippee-wife was aware that she had traded on misappropriated information).
15. See, e.g., United States v. McGee, 763 F.3d 304, 308-22 (3d Cir. 2014) (affirming judgment upholding
conviction of defendant who traded and tipped a friend based on material nonpublic information that was entrusted
to him by the corporate executive whom he had sponsored at Alcoholics Anonymous meetings); SEC v. Rocklage,
470 F.3d 1, 14 n.4 (1st Cir. 2006) (allegations in complaint stated a claim under Rule lOb-5 that the wife of a
corporate executive misappropriated information from her husband in order to give her brother a "gift of
information").
16. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) (emphasizing that the classical and
misappropriation theories of insider trading are "complementary" because they each address "efforts to capitalize
on nonpublic information through the purchase or sale of securities").
17. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d
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Exchange Commission (SEC) efforts to prosecute tipping and trading in both classical-
insider and misappropriation-outsider contexts. One highly publicized instance occurred a
month after Newman, when a federal district court vacated the guilty pleas of several
defendants who had traded on a tip, allegedly passed from one friend to another, about an
imminent acquisition. 22 That court read Newman to demand evidence that the initial tipper
expected a monetary or other quantifiable benefit from his friend-not merely the warm
feelings of satisfaction that occur when one pal does a favor for another. 23 A host of other
defendants, both within and outside the Second Circuit, have since sought to have their
indictments or complaints dismissed, criminal convictions or civil liability determinations
24
overturned, and guilty pleas or settlements vacated. The growing list includes former
Goldman Sachs director Rajat Gupta, who recently convinced the Second Circuit to
reconsider his motion to vacate his conviction for fraudulent tipping.
25
However, in jurisdictions that continue to adhere to Dirks's pronouncement that a
personal benefit derives from gifting information to a friend or family member, the SEC
and DOJ have garnered several post-Newman successes. The government's most salient
victory occurred in the Ninth Circuit, with the decision in United States v. Salman. 6 The
tipper was an investment banker who shared confidential merger and acquisition (M&A)
information with his brother, who traded securities on the basis of that information. 27 The
brother also passed the tips on to the defendant, Bassam Salman (a close friend who later
became a family in-law), who traded as well. 28 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the defendant's
conviction based on Dirks's "gift" language 29 and held that "[p]roof that the insider
disclosed material nonpublic information with the intent to benefit a trading relative or
friend is sufficient to establish the breach of fiduciary duty element of insider trading."
30
The First Circuit has likewise declined to follow Newman's heightened standard for
personal benefit.31
22. United States v. Conradt, No. 12 Cr. 887, 2015 WL 480419 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2015). But see SEC v.
Payton, 97 F. Supp. 3d 558, 563-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding that the SEC stated a valid claim for securities
fraud under Rule 1Ob-5 in a civil enforcement action related to the same tipping at issue in Conradt).
23. See Phyllis Diamond, Newman Topples Insider Charges Against Defendants in IBM Merger Case, 47
SEC. REG. & L. REP. 202 (Jan. 29, 2015) (quoting a letter by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New
York requesting the court to dismiss the indictments because Newman "'creates a novel evidentiary bar for tipper
benefit and tippee knowledge of such a benefit, that the Government cannot now meet').
24. See Greg Stohr & Patricia Hurtado, Insider Cases Imperiled as High Court Spurns Appeal, 47 SEC. REG
& L. REP. 1929 (Oct. 12,2015) (reporting that Newman's ruling "threatens at least 10 convictions" and has "raised
the bar for prosecutions stemming from informatiorf passed by a corporate insider to a friend, relative or business
associate"); Patricia Hurtado, Insider Traders Who May Find Hope in Supreme Court Move: List, 47 SEC. REG
& L. REP. 1930 (Oct. 12, 2015) (identifying prosecutions impacted by the Newman ruling).
25. Chris Dolmetsch, Rajat Gupta's Conviction to Get New Review, 48 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 307 (Feb. 15,
2016). Gupta, who is now out of prison after having served a term of 19 months, id., asserts that he was found
guilty without a finding by the jury that his tips to billionaire hedge fund manager Raj Rajaratnam were part of
"'an agreed-upon exchange of tips for consequential benefits."' Patricia Hurtado, Ex-Goldman Director Gupta
Says Insider Conviction Should Be Tossed, 47 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 540 (Mar. 16, 2015) (quoting Gupta's attorney
Gary Naftalis).
26. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015).
27. Id. at 1089-90.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1092 (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983)).
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., United States v. Parigian, 824 F.3d 5, 15 -16 (1 st Cir. 2016) (finding that the tipper and tippee
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Securities law scholars have mirrored the divergent views of the federal circuits.
Scholars who have sided with Newman include Professors Stephen Bainbridge, Jonathan
Macey, and Todd Henderson. They view Newman as "an important corrective to the
government's drive to expand the limits of insider trading liability," 32 and they regard
communications between corporate executives and securities analysts as "industry activity
that the Supreme Court correctly understands to be normal, socially beneficial, and
important to the integrity of capital markets, and that it explicitly seeks to protect."
33
Professor Adam Pritchard likewise references Dirks's policy objectives and observes that
Justice Lewis Powell's majority opinion sought "to leave space for securities professionals
to uncover nonpublic information, even if it came from corporate insiders." 34 He therefore
concludes that "Newman's interpretation of personal benefit is consistent with, if not
compelled by, Powell's purpose in Dirks."35
My own views coincide with those of scholars including Professors Michael Perino,36
Jay Brown, 37 and James Cox, 38 who each regard Newman as a blatant misapplication of
Dirks and a troubling impediment to effective insider trading enforcement. For as long as
Newman remains the controlling precedent in the "Mother Court" of securities law,
39
unscrupulous tippers-whether corporate insiders or fiduciary outsiders-will be even
more emboldened to leak confidential information, which would undermine investor
confidence by fostering the perception that securities markets are "rigged" against honest
traders. 40 Newman's consequences are particularly troubling because they resulted from
catapulting the policy objectives that motivated Dirks above the Court's actual holding (as
well as the complementary holding in O'Hagan). Although Dirks's doctrine remains a
fundamental component of the federal prohibitions of insider trading and tipping, the policy
were "reasonably good friends" and that the tipper requested and received a golfing outing and other luxury
entertainment in "return for the tips"); United States v. McPhail, 831 F.3d 1, 11 (1 st Cir. 2016) (finding that the
tipper received "concrete benefits" including "a free dinner, wine, and a massage parlor visit" as well as subtle
benefits such as "the group's general gratitude for his largesse").
32. Brief of Amicus Curiae Law Professors Stephen Bainbridge, M. Todd Henderson, and Jonathan Macey
in Opposition to the United States of America's Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at * 1, United States
v. Newman (2014), (No. 13-1837-cr(L)), 2015 WL 1064409.
33. Id. at *9.
34. A.C. Pritchard, Dirks and the Genesis of Personal Benefit, 68 SMU L. REv. 857, 861 (2015).
35. Id. at 874.
36. Michael Perino, The Gift of Inside Information, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 12, 2014),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/12/the-gift-of-inside-information/?_r-0 (pointing out that "[t]he essence of
a 'gift' is that it is gratuitous-a true gift is made with no expectation of anything in return").
37. J. Robert Brown Jr., US v. Newman and the Rewriting of the Law of Insider Trading (Part ]), RACETO
THEBOTTOM.ORG (Mar. 2, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/home/us-v-newman-and-the-
rewriting-of-the-law-of-insider-trading.html (observing that most tips to friends and relatives "will not be
motivated by the potential for pecuniary gain," and criticizing Newman for essentially eliminating "from the
prohibition on insider trading the exchange of information by family members").
38. James D. Cox, Giving Tippers a Pass: US v. Newman, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 27, 2015),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/20l5/01/27/giving-tippers-a-pass-u-s-v-newman-3/ (lamenting that Newman
"pours gas onto [a] raging fire" because "corporate insiders are not very good about keeping secrets [and] their
tippees are delighted that they do not").
39. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
40. See infra text accompanying note 235 (quoting congressional concerns about the harms from insider
trading); infra text accompanying note 145 (referencing O'Hagan's observation that promoting investor
confidence and market integrity are "animating" purposes of the Exchange Act).
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goals that Dirks sought to achieve fail to align with those currently of Congress and the
SEC-the expert agency that Congress created to administer and enforce the federal
securities laws.
With its grant of certiorari in Salman v. United States,4 1 the Court will revisit the
legality of gratuitous tipping. The question presented quotes from Newman's holding and
expressly asks the Court to determine which circuit interpreted Dirks correctly. 42 After
being left to the devices of lower courts for the nearly two decades since O'Hagan and the
33 years since Dirks, the fictionalized fate of The Big Chill's Harold-and the very real
fate of Salman and dozens of other defendants in pending cases-now lies with the
Supreme Court.
The Court's 2016-17 term will therefore be extraordinarily important for the law of
insider trading, no matter how the Court ultimately rules on the legality of gratuitous
tipping. While the Court in Salman could affirm the Ninth Circuit simply by invoking
Dirks's explicit statement that informational gifts to relatives or friends fall within the
personal-benefit test, this Article sets out two alternate paths that the Court could take in
resolving this crucial controversy.
If the Court chooses to adhere to its "deceptive silence by a fiduciary" paradigm, the
first alternative involves looking beyond Dirks to consider a potent combination of four
developments in corporate and securities law: 1) the "fraud on the source"
misappropriation theory, which the O'Hagan Court endorsed in a 6-3 opinion authored by
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg; 43 2) federal securities legislation in 1984, 1988, and 2012
that clearly ratifies, and builds on, the Court's holdings that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
prohibit insider trading and tipping; 44 3) the SEC's decision in 2000 effectively to ban the
practice of selective disclosure through its adoption of Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure); 45
and 4) state court decisions that construe breaches of the duty of loyalty to encompass other
deliberate conduct evidencing a lack of good faith, in addition to actions involving self-
dealing. 4 6 These developments not only bolster the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Dirks,
they also pave the way for a clearer doctrine of joint tipper-tippee liability that explicitly
turns on a tipper's breach of the duty of loyalty, whether or not that breach resulted in a
personal benefit to the tipper.
The alternative approach, which I term the "fraud on contemporaneous traders" path,
41. Salman v. United States, 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cit. 2015), cert. granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3405 (U.S. Jan. 19,
2016) (No. 15-628).
42. See infra note 134 (quoting the first question presented in Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *i, Salman
v. United States, 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-628), 2015 WL 7180648, (filed Nov. 10, 2015)).
43. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652, 682 (1997).
44. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA), Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984); Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA), Pub. L. No. 100-704, 120 Stat. 4677 (1988);
Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105, 176 Stat. 291 (2012).
45. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2011).
46. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivatives Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); Stone ex rel. AmSouth
Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). In addition, although it can hardly be categorized as a
development in its own right, the Court's decision in Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 474 U.S.
299 (1985), provides valuable contemporaneous insight into how the Court construed the then-recent test for joint
tipper-tippee liability in the course of deciding whether to recognize an in part delicto (unclean hands) defense,
which would have barred plaintiff investors from recovering under Rule lOb-5 the damages they incurred from
purchasing securities on the basis of what amounted to "false tips" by the defendants. See infra text accompanying
notes 89-94 (discussing Bateman Eichler).
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is one I have advocated in previous articles, 47 but never at such a crucial doctrinal juncture
as now, when the Court will determine the scope of investor protection from insider
trading, perhaps for generations to come. Rather than simply clarifying the doctrine ofjoint
tipper-tippee liability, the Court should re-conceptualize insider trading law more generally
by consolidating its prior classical and misappropriation approaches into a new "fraud on
contemporaneous traders" theory. Under this unified and expanded approach, which was
first espoused by Chief Justice Warren Burger in his Chiarella dissent,4 8 and possibly
foreshadowed in a recent Court opinion,49 the Rule 1Ob-5 disclosure obligation would run
to the securities investors who traded with the person who obtained an informational
advantage through misappropriation or some other improper means. 50 To be sure, this
approach is not cabined by fiduciary principles and the O'Hagan decision did not reflect
"a theory of that breadth.",51 But to better serve Congress's and the SEC's policy goals of
promoting market integrity and investor confidence in securities markets, 52 and to buttress
the congressional determinations to regard insider trading and tipping as a species of
securities fraud, 53 Rule 1Ob-5's insider trading and tipping prohibitions should be
construed as broadly as Section 10(b)'s statutory text allows. Salman thus provides a
unique opportunity for the Court to endorse a "fraud on contemporaneous traders" theory
of liability, which would make insider trading law substantially more coherent and
legitimate. 
54
The analysis in this Article proceeds in six parts. Part II discusses the rulings in
Newman and Salman, and recounts Chiarella's classical theory and the personal benefit
test that the Court developed in Dirks. Part III focuses on the misappropriation theory and
criticizes Newman for considering neither the doctrine nor the policy objectives set out in
O'Hagan. Part IV shifts the focus to Congress and examines its essential role in the
development of insider trading jurisprudence. Part V analyzes Regulation FD and explains
why its adoption by the SEC casts a shadow on the rationale that underlies Dirks's personal
benefit test. Part VI examines Delaware Supreme Court decisions that construe breaches
47. See generally Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94
IOWA L. REv. 1315, 1369-78 (2009) [hereinafter Nagy, Fiduciary Principles]; Donna M. Nagy, Refraining the
Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: A Post-O'Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223 (1998)
[hereinafter Nagy, Refraining Misappropriation].
48. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240-45 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also infra
note 392 (observing that Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall agreed with the Chief Justice's view of the
disclosure obligation).
49. See infra text accompanying notes 397-398 (analyzing Justice Breyer's multiple citations to O'Hagan
in his majority opinion in Chadbourne & Park LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058 (2014)).
50. See infra Part VII.B.
51. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 n.6 (1997).
52. See infra text accompanying notes 144-49, 210, 235 (quoting O'Hagan and Exchange Act legislative
history).
53. See infra Part IV.
54. Indeed, while the Court's classical and misappropriation approaches can be set out in a few sentences,
they have nonetheless resulted in a jurisprudence that is unnecessarily complex. See Peter J. Henning, What's So
Bad About Insider Trading Law?, 70 Bus. LAW. 751, 757 (2015) (lamenting that insider trading law has grown
"largely in fits and starts, rather than through a clear progression reflecting a coherent conception of the many
aspects that make up a violation"); see also Thomas Lee Hazen, Identifying the Duty Prohibiting Outsider Trading
on Material Nonpublic Information, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 883 (2010) (observing that there are "hundreds of
decisions grappling" with Rule lOb-5's application to insider trading, and emphasizing that many of these
decisions "are confusing and inconsistent with one another").
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of the duty of loyalty to include not only self-dealing but also intentional failures to act in
good faith, and it links this more expansive notion of fiduciary duty to the federal insider
trading and tipping prohibitions arising under Rule 1 Ob-5. Part VII concludes by proposing
two alternate resolutions to the critical controversy over gratuitous tipping: a modest path
that would simply clarify joint tipper-tippee liability and a bolder path that would
consolidate the classical and misappropriation theories into a unified and expanded theory
of insider trading that premises the Rule 1Ob-5 violation on a "fraud on contemporaneous
traders."
II. NEWMAN'S AND SALMAN'S APPLICATION OF DIRKS
A. The Stock Trading Tips in Newman
The defendants in Newman, Todd Newman and Anthony Chiasson, were portfolio
managers at hedge funds holding billions of dollars in client-wealth. 55 After a six-week
trial, a jury found them guilty of securities fraud, and a judge sentenced them to prison
terms exceeding five years, for trading stocks based on material nonpublic earnings
information related to Dell, Inc. and NVIDIA Corporation.56 The defendants received that
information indirectly and quite remotely from an insider at each company. 57 Newman's
stock trading generated more than $4 million in profits for the funds he managed and
Chiasson's funds reaped profits exceeding $68 million.
58
The evidence at trial showed that the confidential earnings information pertaining to
Dell and NVIDIA had passed along an elaborate chain of three or four tippees that
culminated with Newman and Chiasson. 59 The first link in the Dell chain was an employee
who worked in the company's investor-relations department.6° In multiple conversations
occurring primarily at nights or on weekends, the Dell insider provided pre-announcement
quarterly earnings information to a securities analyst at Neuberger Berman, who was a
former colleague he had known "for years, having both attended business school and
worked at Dell together."6 1 The Dell insider also had repeatedly sought out career advice
from the Neuberger analyst, and the analyst in turn had edited the Dell insider's resume
and shared it with "a Wall Street recruiter." 62 Whether the Dell insider and the securities
analyst were in fact "friends" turns on that term's definition. 63 With respect to the stock
trading in NVIDIA, the first link in that chain was an employee who had worked in the
55. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 442-43 (2d Cir. 2014).




60. Newman, 773 F.3d at 443.
61. Id. at452.
62. Id.
63. See Ethan J. Lieb, Friendship & the Law, 54 UCLA L. REv. 631, 638 (2007) (while "the vast majority
of us know [our family members], figuring out who constitutes a friend-and when friendship starts and ends-
may be a harder task"). Whereas the government asserted that the Dell insider and the securities analyst were
"friends," the defendants contended that that were simply acquaintances who were "not that close." Reply Brief
of Defendant-Appellant Todd Newman at 41, United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
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company's finance unit. 64 Over a period of more than two years, the NVIDIA insider
relayed quarterly pre-announcement earnings information about the company to a
technology executive at Broadcom Corporation who was a "'family friend[ ]' that [he] had
met through church." 65 Both Dell and NVIDIA had clear policies specifying that quarterly
earnings information was to remain strictly confidential until the company made a public
announcement.
66
B. The Classical Theory of Insider Trading
The mere fact that Newman and Chiasson traded stock in Dell and NVIDIA on the
basis of material nonpublic earnings-related information does not, without more, establish
liability for securities fraud. Although the offense of insider trading had been premised at
one time on a "parity of information" approach developed by the SEC in In re Cady,
Roberts & Co.6 7 and endorsed by the Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,68
the Supreme Court rejected that expansive view of liability in the landmark case of
Chiarella v. United States.69 In so doing, Chiarella entrenched the classical theory of
insider trading, which premises securities fraud liability on a person's silence about
material nonpublic information in a securities transaction "when one party has information
'that the other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of
trust and confidence between them."'
70
Chiarella's focus was on "securities fraud" because Congress has not enacted a
federal statute that explicitly prohibits anyone from "insider trading" or "tipping." Instead,
those offenses typically have been prosecuted as a violation of the broad antifraud
prohibitions in Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5. 7 1 Insider trading law in the United States is
thus derived from judicial interpretations of Section 10(b)'s prohibition of deception "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security,"' 72 and when tender offers are at issue,
64. Newman, 773 F.3d at 443.
65. Id. at 452.
66. Superseding Indictment, United States v. Newman, S2 12 Cr. 121 (RJS), August 28, 2012. Paragraph
8 of the Twelve-Count Superseding Indictment charged that: "[t]he Inside Information... was obtained in
violation of: (i) fiduciary and other duties of trust and confidence owed by the employees of the Technology
Companies to their employers; (ii) expectations of confidentiality held by the Technology companies; (iii) written
policies of the Technology Companies regarding the use and safekeeping of confidential business information;
and (iv) agreements between the Technology Companies and their employees to maintain information in
confidence." Id. 8.
67. See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, No. 8-3925 at * 4 (1961) (holding that the obligation to
disclose or abstain from trading rests on two principal elements: "first, the existence of a relationship giving
access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the
personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing").
68. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that "anyone in possession
of material inside information must either disclose it to the investing public... [or] must abstain from trading in
or recommending the securities concerned").
69. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
70. Id. at 228 (emphasis added) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (AM. LAW.
INST. 1977)).
71. See id. at 226 (observing that, in Cady, Roberts, "[tlhe SEC took an important step in the development
of§ 10(b)").
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1934).
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Section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3 as well. 73
Dirks v. SEC74 is the precedent most squarely on point with the facts of Newman.
Dirks involved disclosures made by former and present officers at the insurance company
Equity Funding of America (Equity Funding). 71 Those insiders shared negative nonpublic
information about Equity Funding with the securities analyst Raymond Dirks, who in turn
advised his clients that they could avoid huge losses by quickly selling their shares in the
company. 76 The information pertained to the company's involvement in a massive fraud,
and the insiders (principally its former officer Ronald Secrist) had enlisted Dirks to assist
them in their whistleblowing efforts. 77 Building on Chiarella's classical theory, the Court
concluded that the shareholders on the other side of Dirks's clients' transactions could have
been deceived and thus defrauded under Rule 1 Ob-5 only if Secrist and the other insiders
had breached a fiduciary duty of "trust and confidence" by personally benefitting directly
or indirectly from their disclosure. 78 Evidence of a "personal benefit" required courts to
focus on "objective criteria," such as whether an insider's tip would generate a quid pro
quo producing "a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future
earnings." 79 But Dirks likewise observed that the "[t]he elements of fiduciary duty and
exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of
confidential information to a trading relative or friend."80
Dirks thus held that securities analysts and other tippees effectively inherit a corporate
insider's fiduciary disclosure obligation if-but only if-"the insider has breached his
fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee
knows or should know that there has been a breach." 81 In other words, Dirks insisted that
Rule 1 Ob-5 liability must turn on proof that the tipper received a personal benefit from the
disclosure and, in prosecutions for illegally trading on a tip, proof that the tippee was aware
of the tipper's breach of duty. 82 Thus, to the Court in Dirks, any disclosure obligation on
the part of the tippee would be "derivative from that of the insider's duty."
83
73. The SEC adopted Rule 14e-3 in 1980, subsequent to the securities transactions at issue in Chiarella.
Once "substantial steps" toward a tender offer have been taken, the rule prohibits trading by any person in
possession of material nonpublic information relating to that tender offer when that person knows or has reason
to know that the information is nonpublic and was received from the offeror, the target, or any person acting on
behalf of either the offeror or the target. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2016); see also United States v. O'Hagan,
521 U.S. 642, 672-73 (1997) (ruling that Rule 14e-3 qualifies as a "means reasonably designed to prevent" fraud
in connection with tender offers within the meaning of Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act).
74. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
75. Id. at 649.
76. See id. at 650 (observing that when Equity Funding's negative news hit the market, its stock price
dropped from $26 to $15 per share).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 663.
79. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663.
80. Id. at 664.
81. Id. at 660.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 659; see also id. at 662 (concluding that "[a]bsent some personal gain, there has been no breach
of duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach"). Although Dirks stated
that a disclosure duty attaches when the tippee "knows or should know that there has been a breach," for a tippee's
securities trading to violate Rule 10b-5, there must also be a finding that the tippee acted with scienter.
Accordingly, with a view to the scienter requirement, courts often phrase the disclosure obligation as one
generated when the tippee knows or is reckless in not knowing that the insider breached a fiduciary duty by
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Dirks eschewed a broader reading of Rule lOb-5 because the Court did not want to
dissuade securities analysts from "ferret[ing] out and analyz[ing] information" that
contributes to pricing efficiency, which "redounds to the benefit of all investors."
' 84
According to Justice Powell, much of this "necessary" and "commonplace" ferreting was
"done by meeting with and questioning corporate officers and others who are insiders"
85
about "information that corporations may have reason to withhold from the public." 86 As
Professor Merritt Fox has concluded, "[i]t is clear from the majority opinion that the Court
added this personal benefit test for policy reasons." 
87
Dirks's apposite concern about personal benefit, however, applies whether the
corporation's information was exchanged for a tangible benefit or merely given away for
the personal benefit of its recipient. Either way, an insider's disclosure would involve
"'inherent unfairness.' because the insider would be taking "'advantage' of 'information





But even if the Court had left a doubt in Dirks as to whether an insider benefits
personally when he or she gives a principal's information as a gift, the Court clarified that
point less than two years later in Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner.89 The
facts of Bateman Eichler prompted the Court to revisit its test for joint tipper-tippee
liability in the course of deciding whether to recognize an in pari delicto (unclean hands)
defense, which would have barred the plaintiff investors from recovering under Rule lOb-
5 the damages they incurred from purchasing stock on the basis of what amounted to false
tips by the defendants. 90 The Court viewed the plaintiffs as "unwitting dupes" in the
defendants' market manipulation scheme and ultimately concluded that there was no basis
for applying the defense at such an early stage of the litigation. 9 1 But notably, in reaching
disclosing information. See Donald C. Langevoort, "Fine Distinctions" in the Contemporary Law of Insider
Trading, 2013 COL. Bus. L. REV. 429, 455-56 (observing that "[t]he 'knows or should know' standard in Dirks
has always been hard to explain" and that courts often "use recklessness here instead"). For an argument that
tippee liability requires a mental state beyond recklessness, see Joan MacLeod Heminway, Willful Blindness,
Plausible Deniability, and Tippee Liability: SAC, Steve Cohen, and the Court's Opinion in Dirks, 15
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L. 47,54-55 (2013).
84. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658 n.17; see also id. at 659 (emphasizing that the "information that the analysts
obtain normally may be the basis for judgments as to the market worth of a corporation's securities" and that "[i]t
is the nature of this type of information, and indeed of markets themselves, that such information cannot be made
simultaneously available to all of the corporation's stockholders or the public generally").
85. Id. at 658.
86. Id.at658n.18.
87. See Merritt B. Fox, Regulation FD and Foreign Issuers: Globalization's Strains and Opportunities, 41
VA. J. INT'L L. 653, 660 (2001) (observing that "[tihe Court felt that the analyst interview is a socially valuable
practice that would be chilled by a Rule lOb-5 prohibition against any selective revelations of material non-public
information that might occur during such an interview").
88. Dirks, 463 U.S at 654 (quoting In re Merrill Lynch, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 936 (1968)).
89. Bateman Eichler v. Bemer, 472 U.S. 299 (1985).
90. The Bateman Eichler defendants were a securities brokerage and the president of the corporation that
had issued the stock. The plaintiffs alleged that these defendants had fraudulently induced their stock purchases
by communicating false and misleading information about the corporation under the ruse that they were
conveying reliable, material nonpublic information. See id. at 301-02. The plaintiffs admitted in their complaint
that they purchased the stock "on the premise that their broker "'was privy to certain information not otherwise
available to the general public."' Id. at 302 (quoting complaint).
91. The Court had assumed, for purposes of its decision, that the defendants were correct in viewing the
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that conclusion, it quoted Dirks's holding that tippee liability turns on whether a tipper
"'benefit[s] directly or indirectly, from his disclosure, ' 92 and expressly observed that
"[s]uch benefit can derive from the insider's use of information to secure a 'pecuniary
gain,' a 'reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings,' or simply to confer 'a
gift of information to a trading relative or friend. " 93 Beyond that, in questioning whether
the facts established that the investors "were aware" the insider breached a fiduciary duty
by disclosing material nonpublic information to their broker (who in turn relayed the tips
to them), the Court looked to whether the investors "had a basis to believe" that the insider
provided the information to the broker "as a favor or otherwise acted against the
shareholders' interests." 94 As the SEC emphasized in a 1985 special report to Congress,
Bateman Eichler's discussion of Dirks in the course of its ruling confirms the Court's
contemporaneous view that gratuitous tipping violates Rule 1 Ob-5.
C. Newman's Novel Reading of Dirks
Although the jury in Newman concluded that the insiders at Dell and NVIDIA had
benefitted from their disclosures of the confidential earnings-related information, 96 the
Second Circuit overturned that finding because, in its view, the "circumstantial evidence
in this case was simply too thin to warrant the inference that the corporate insiders received
any personal benefit in exchange for their tips." 97 As the court saw it, if the facts presented
by the government constituted "a 'benefit,' practically anything would qualify." 98 The
court acknowledged Dirks's suggestion that "a personal benefit may be inferred from a
personal relationship between the tipper and tippee." 99 But it then held that "such an
inference is impermissible in the absence of proof of a meaningfully close personal
relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at
least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature." 1 °0 The court also
emphasized what it drew as a "fundamental insight" from Dirks: "that, in order to form the
basis for a fraudulent breach, the personal benefit received in exchange for confidential
information must be of some consequence." 101 The court therefore concluded that the
plaintiffs as "tippees" who had traded in violation of Rule IOb-5. But in the Court's view, there were "important
distinctions between the relative culpabilities of tippers, securities professionals, and tippees in these
circumstances," based in part on the fact that insider-tippers typically defraud not only the shareholders on the
other side of a tippee's transaction but also the corporation that entrusted the insiders with the material nonpublic
information. See id. at 313-14; see also infra text accompanying notes 184-186 (discussing culpability issues).
92. Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 310 n.21 (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663).
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. See infra text accompanying notes 227-34 (discussing the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and
the House Committee on Commerce and Energy's mandate for a follow-up study by the SEC).
96. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 444 (2d Cir. 2014). The district court instructed that the jury
must consider "'whether the [G]overnment has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that [the Dell and NVIDIA
insiders] intentionally breached that duty of trust and confidence by disclosing material nonpublic information
for their own benefit."' Id. (quoting Tr. 4030).
97. Id. at451-52.
98. Id. at 452.
99. Id.
100. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452.
101. Id.
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government cannot prove the existence of a tipper's personal benefit "by the mere fact of
a friendship, particularly of a casual or social nature." ' 1 2 Although Newman acknowledged
Dirks's reference to an informational gift, the court failed to quote Dirks's key "gift"
sentence, and then it compounded that error by overlooking entirely the Court's restatement
of that "gift" language in Bateman Eichler. 
103
The Second Circuit also took issue with the jury's determination that the government
proved beyond a reasonable doubt the requisite knowledge on the part of the defendants.
The trial court's instruction had allowed the jury to consider whether the defendants knew
that the information about Dell and NVIDIA "was originally disclosed by the insider in
violation of a duty of confidentiality."' 10 4 The court deemed that instruction erroneous
because to satisfy Dirks's knowledge requirement, the government had to prove that
Newman and Chiasson, as remote tippees, either knew or should have known of "the
tipper's breach of fiduciary duty."10 5 And as the court saw it, "the exchange of confidential
information for personal benefit ... is the fiduciary breach that triggers liability for
securities fraud under Rule 1Ob-5." 106 It therefore held that "without establishing that the
tippee knows of the personal benefit received by the insider in exchange for the disclosure,
the Government cannot meet its burden of showing that the tippee knew of a breach."
' 10 7
The court then focused on an evidentiary failing that it deemed fatal to the government's
case: according to the court, the government failed to present any "testimony or any other
evidence that [the defendants] knew ... that those insiders received any benefit in
exchange for such disclosures." 108 The court thus reversed the defendants' convictions and
dismissed their indictments because "no rational jury would find that the tips were so
overwhelmingly suspicious that [the defendants] either knew or consciously avoided
knowing that the information came from corporate insiders or that those insiders received
any personal benefit in exchange for the disclosure." 
109
After the government unsuccessfully sought to have Newman reheard, 110 its last resort
appeared to be review by the Supreme Court. The Solicitor General petitioned for a writ of
certiorari, which presented the question whether Newman's interpretation of personal
benefit constituted an erroneous departure from the "gifting theory" in Dirks.111 The
government contended that Newman, in the "guise of interpreting" Dirks, had actually
102. Id.
103. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (quoting Bateman Eichler). In addition, the Newman court
made no attempt to reconcile its tangible benefit requirement with the Second Circuit's contrasting statement in
SEC v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42, 48 (2nd Cir. 1998) (concluding that the government "need not show that the tipper
expected or received a specific or tangible benefit in exchange for the tip").
104. Newman, 773 F.3d at 444 (quoting jury instructions at Tr. 4033:14-22).
105. Id. at 447 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980)).
106. Id. at 447-48 (emphasis in original).
107. Id. at 448.
108. Id. at453.
109. Newman, 773 F.3d at 455.
110. See United States v. Newman, No. 13-1837L, 2015 WL 1954058 (2d Cir. April 3, 2015) (denying the
government's petition for a panel rehearing, or in the alternative, for a rehearing en banc).
11. U.S. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, United States v. Newman, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015) (No. 15-137).
The sole question presented was: "whether the court of appeals erroneously departed from this Court's decision
in Dirks by holding that liability under a gifting theory requires 'proof of a meaningfully close personal
relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of
a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature."' Id.
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"crafted a newer, stricter personal benefit test" that essentially collapsed the dual categories
of quid pro quos and gifts into a single category that rendered Dirks's entire "gift"
discussion superfluous. 112 However, once the Court announced the denial of certiorari, 113
the government turned to developing a litigation strategy that accentuates tangible benefits
on the part of tippers, whenever possible.
1 14
D. The Grant of Certiorari in Salman
In contrast to Newman's multi-layered tipping chains and the controverted evidence
pertaining to the tippers' motives, the facts of Salman are relatively straightforward. Over
a period of more than three years, Bassam Salman repeatedly received stock trading tips
from Michael Kara, whose younger brother, Maher Kara, was an investment banker
employed by Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. 115 Maher (who pled guilty to charges of
conspiracy and securities fraud) admitted that he breached duties owed to Citigroup and its
M&A clients when he secretly shared confidential information with his older brother
Michael, knowing that Michael was using that information to purchase securities in the
targets. 116 Maher further "testified that he 'love[d] [his] brother very much' and that he
gave Michael the inside information in order to 'benefit him' and to 'fulfill [ ] whatever
needs he had."' 117 Michael, in turn, shared the confidential information with Salman (a
close friend who later became an in-law), and encouraged Salman to "mirror-imag[e]" his
112. Id. at 18-19. The government's petition did not seek review of the Second Circuit's ruling concerning
the insufficiency of evidence pertaining to the defendants' knowledge of the tippers' personal benefits. Several
commentators questioned this tactical move and predicted that the Court would deny the government's petition
because it amounted to a request for an advisory opinion on the personal benefit issue. See Roger Parloff, Why
the Supreme Court Might Not Hear a Crucial Insider Trading Case, FORTUNE (Sept. 23, 2015),
http://fortune.com/2015/09/23/supreme-court-insider-trading-newman/ (observing that "federal courts aren't
supposed to render 'advisory opinions' ... even if such an opinion might give helpful guidance in future cases").
113. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 446 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015).
114. See Richard Hill, SEC Still Bringing Insider Trading Cases Despite Newman Loss, 47 SEC. REG. L.
REP. 2397 (Dec. 21, 2015) (quoting the SEC's Associate Director of Enforcement statement that after Newman,
the agency is having to "work harder to establish a relationship that helps satisfy the court's personal benefit
standard").
115. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2015).
116. Id. Notably, Citigroup represented the acquiring company in three of the four impending acquisitions
that generated the investment banker's gratuitous tips about the securities of the acquisition targets. See Brief for
Petitioner at 6, 12-15, Salman v. United States, (No. 15-628), 2106 WL 2732058 (filed May 6, 2016) (stating
that Salman was convicted of four substantive counts of insider trading, which pertained to his trades in securities
of Biosite Incorporated (with Citigroup representing the acquiring company) and United Surgical Partners
International, Inc. (with Citigroup representing a private equity firm that was interested in buying out the other
USPI shareholders); see also id. at 12 (observing that Salman was also convicted of a single count of conspiracy
to engage in insider trading, which pertained to his securities purchases in USPI and Biosite as well as in Andrx
Corporation (with Citigroup representing the acquirer) and Bone Care International, Inc (with Citigroup
representing the acquisition target in the company's sale to Genzyme). Thus, only a fraction of the petitioner's
illegal profits resulted from a transaction in which Citigroup represented, and thereby owed fiduciary-like duties
to, the target company's shareholders-the lion's share of the illicit gains resulted from "outsider" tipping and
trading. See Brief of Respondent United States at 6, Salman v. United States (No. 78-15628), 2016 WL 4088380
(filed Aug. 1, 2016) (observing that nearly SI million of petitioner's profits came from the investment banker's
"tip that Biosite was about to be acquired by a Citigroup client").
117. Salman, 792 F.3d at 1089 (quoting testimony introduced at Salman's trial).
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trading activity. 8 Salman did so, but rather than trade securities through a brokerage
account in his own name, Salman deposited money into an account owned by his sister and
her husband, and arranged with the husband to split the trading profits, which totaled
approximately $1.7 million. 119 Michael, who also pled guilty, testified that he told Salman
that the M&A information was coming from Maher. 120 The court thus observed that the
government "presented evidence that Salman knew full well that Maher Kara was the
source of the information."1 2 1 After ajury found Salman guilty of conspiracy and securities
fraud, the district court sentenced him to three years in prison.
In view of these facts, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the case was governed by the
gift-giving holding in Dirks, which the court found to apply in a misappropriation theory
case, "like the instant case, where the fiduciary duty is owed, not to the shareholders, but
to the tipper's employer, client, or the like."122 Specifically, the court emphasized Dirks's
statement that "'[tihe elements offiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information
also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or
friend."' 123 As the Ninth Circuit saw it, "Maher's disclosure of confidential information
to Michael, knowing that he intended to trade on it, was precisely the 'gift of confidential
information to a trading relative' that Dirks envisioned." 124
The Ninth Circuit then confronted-and rejected-the defendant's arguments that his
conviction could not be sustained in the absence of proof that Maher received a "tangible
benefit" for the information gifted to Michael, and that the ruling in Newman requires "the
exchange of information [to] include 'at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly
valuable nature."' 125 The court stated plainly that "[t]o the extent Newman can be read to
go so far, we decline to follow it." 126 In the court's view, insistence of proof of a tangible
benefit would require it "to depart from the clear holding of Dirks that the element of breach
of fiduciary duty is met where an 'insider makes a gift of confidential information to a
trading relative or friend. ,2' And where there is evidence of a gift, reading Dirks to also
require a "tangible benefit" would create a troubling loophole: "a corporate insider or other
person in possession of confidential and proprietary information would be free to disclose
that information to her relatives, and they would be free to trade on it, provided only that
she asked for no tangible compensation in return." 128 The Ninth Circuit therefore
concluded that "[p]roof that the insider disclosed material nonpublic information with the
intent to benefit a trading relative or friend is sufficient to establish the breach of fiduciary
duty element of insider trading." 
129
Salman's petition for a writ of certiorari to the Ninth Circuit did not challenge the
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Salman, 792 F.3d at 1089 (observing that the Kara and Salman families were very close-in 2003,
Maher became engaged to Salman's sister and they were married in 2005).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1092 n.4.
123. Id. at 1092 (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983)).
124. Id.
125. Salman, 792 F.3d at 1093 (quoting United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014)).
126. Id.
127. Id. (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663).
128. Id. at 1094.
129. Id.
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sufficiency of the evidence that he purchased securities in acquisition targets on the basis
of M&A information misappropriated by Maher from Citigroup and its clients. Instead, the
petition emphasized that here, in contrast to Newman, the resolution of the issue of
gratuitous tipping was "indisputably outcome-determinative." ' 130 That is, the petition
argued that:
If a close family relationship between the insider and the tippee is enough to
establish a personal benefit for the insider, as the Ninth Circuit held here, then
Salman loses. But if there must be "an exchange that is objective, consequential,
and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable
nature," as the Second Circuit held in Newman, then Salman prevails, because
there is no evidence of such an exchange here between the insider and the
tippee. 131
The government countered that "[f]urther review [was] not warranted" because the Ninth
Circuit's decision on the personal benefit issue was correct and "fully consistent with this
Court's decision in Dirks."'132 But early in 2016, the Court agreed to hear the case of
Salman v. United States,133 noting that the grant was "limited to Question 1 presented by
the petition." 134 Thus, the government will attempt to persuade the Court to eradicate
Newman's unreasonably high hurdle for proving a personal benefit under the test in Dirks.
III. MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY-DOCTRINE AND POLICY
Although the DOJ and the SEC have been steadfast in their view that the Second
Circuit's stricter personal benefit standard cannot be reconciled with Dirks, the government
has thus far failed to dispute the operating premise that joint tipper-tippee liability turns
entirely on Dirks's precedent. 13 5 But using Dirks as the sole determinant of joint tipper-
tippee liability marginalizes the groundbreaking decision in United States v. O'Hagan, 1
36
and improperly privileges the policy views of Justice Powell and the Dirks majority over
the ensuing views of Justice Ginsburg and the five other justices who joined in her
opinion. 13"Disloyal fiduciaries who breach their duties of trust and confidence by secretly
130. Salman v. United States, 792 F.3d 1087, petition for cert., 2015 WL 7180648, at *2 (9th Cit. Nov. 10,
2015) (No. 15-628).
131. Id.
132. Brief for the United States in Opposition, at *9, Salman v. United States, 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. Dec.
14,2015) (No. 15-628), 10872015 WL 8959421.
133. Salman v. United States, No. 15-628, 2016 WL 207256 (cert. granted, Jan. 19, 2016).
134. Id. Question 1 in the petition reads in full: "[d]oes the personal benefit to the insider that is necessary
to establish insider trading under Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), require proof of 'an exchange that is
objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature,' as
the Second Circuit held in United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, No. 15-137 (U.S.
Oct. 5, 2015), or is it enough that the insider and the tippee shared a close family relationship, as the Ninth Circuit
held in this case?" Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 130, at i.
135. But see infra note 174 (discussing unsuccessful attempts by the DOJ and SEC to convince courts that
the personal benefit test applies only in classical cases and not to tipper-tippee cases brought under a
misappropriation theory).
136. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
137. In addition to Justices Breyer and Kennedy, the three others in the O'Hagan majority were Justices
Sandra Day O'Connor, David Souter, and John Paul Stevens. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting
opinion in which Chief Justice William Rehnquist joined and Justice Antonin Scalia authored a separate
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disclosing confidential information to securities traders are "misappropriators," and they
should be viewed as such regardless of whether the tipper stands as an insider under the
classical theory or an outsider under the misappropriation theory.
A. The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading
Both the facts and the holding in O'Hagan are very well known. The case involved a
partner at a national law firm who purchased stock in a takeover target on the basis of
material nonpublic information that he learned from his law firm and its client, which had
been planning the hostile acquisition. Chiarella and Dirks's classical theory would not have
supported the attorney's prosecution because he stood as an outsider to the target
corporation and thus did not owe its shareholders a disclosure duty grounded in a
relationship of trust and confidence. The Court, however, had little trouble affirming the
jury's verdict that the attorney's securities trading had violated Rule lOb-5 by deceiving
and defrauding his law firm and its client "in connection with" his purchases of stock and
options in the takeover target. The Court viewed the attorney as a misappropriator who
"deal[t] in deception." 138 That is, in the Court's view, "a fiduciary's undisclosed, self-
serving use of a principal's information to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty
of loyalty and confidentiality" 139 satisfies Rule 1Ob-5's deception requirement because the
fiduciary "feign[s] fidelity," 140 and thereby "defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of
that information."14 1 The Court also found that this deception satisfies Rule lOb-5's "in
connection with" requirement "because the fiduciary's fraud is consummated, not when
the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when, without disclosure to his
principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell securities." ' 142 Thus, the fiduciary's
breach of loyalty "coincide[s]" with his securities transaction. 143
While O'Hagan grounded its holding in Section 10(b)'s text, the Court also bolstered
its statutory analysis with the "congressional purposes underlying § 10(b)."' 144 In so doing,
Justice Ginsburg framed the "fraud on the source" misappropriation theory to advance the
important policy objectives of ensuring "honest securities markets" and promoting
"investor confidence." 145 These objectives went far beyond Justice Powell's objective in
Dirks, which was to ensure that insiders did not profit directly or indirectly from their
dissenting opinion.
138. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653-54.
139. Id. at 652.
140. Id. at 655.
141. Id. at 652; see also id. at 664 (quoting Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987) (observing
that "[a] company's confidential information... qualifies as property to which the company has a right of
exclusive use" and that "[t]he undisclosed misappropriation of such information, in violation of a fiduciary
duty ... constitutes fraud akin to embezzlement-'the fraudulent appropriation to one's own use of the money or
goods entrusted to one's care by another').
142. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655-56.
143. Id. The O'Hagan Court recognized, however, that "full disclosure forecloses liability under the
misappropriation theory." Id. at 655. That is, "if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on
the nonpublic information, there is no 'deceptive device' and thus no § 10(b) violation." Id.
144. Id. at 659.
145. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658 (observing that the misappropriation theory was "well-tuned to an animating
purpose of the Exchange Act").
[Vol. 42:1
Beyond Dirks: Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading
informational advantage in securities transactions with the corporation's shareholders. 
14 6
Although it was hardly a complete return to the parity of information approach, Justice
Ginsburg masterfully reconnected the federal insider trading prohibition to some of the
fairness principles that had punctuated those pre-Chiarella decisions. 147 That is, Justice
Ginsburg observed that "investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a market
where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law."
' 148
She therefore concluded that "considering the inhibiting impact on market participation of
trading on misappropriated information" it would "make[] scant sense to hold a lawyer like
O'Hagan a § 10(b) violator if he works for a law firm representing the target of a tender
offer, but not if he works for a law firm representing the bidder." 14 9 O'Hagan was clear,
however, that the misappropriation theory had an outward limit insofar as it applied only
"to those who breach[ed] a recognized duty" owed to the information's source. 150
Had Justice Powell remained on the bench for the O'Hagan decision, he almost
certainly would have disagreed with Justice Ginsburg's "fraud on the source" analysis,
both with respect to her textual interpretation and her normative evaluation. As we know
from Professor Pritchard's historical research,1 5 1 shortly before Powell's retirement, the
Justice had urged his colleagues to grant certiorari in Carpenter v. United States.152 As
Professor Pritchard explains, Justice Powell viewed the petition as a prime opportunity to
overturn the misappropriation theory that was well ensconced in the Second Circuit.
153
Because the Court initially intended to deny certiorari, Justice Powell wrote a draft dissent,
which he later withdrew when the Court re-voted to hear the case. But his draft had
emphasized what he regarded as the misappropriation theory's tension with Chiarella and
Dirks as well as its inconsistency with Section 10(b)'s requirement that the fraud be "in
connection with" the purchase or sale of a security. 154 Accordingly, in all likelihood,
146. See A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O'Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell's Legacy for the Law of
Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13, 43 (1998) (observing that "[p]olicy concerns and congressional intent, not
the common law of deceit followed by Powell in Chiarella and Dirks., guided the Court's decision in O'Hagan");
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between Property Rights and
Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589, 1648 (1999) (depicting O'Hagan as an "arguable revival of the long-
discredited equal access theory of liability").
147. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68 (discussing the SEC's decision in Cady, Roberts and the
Second Circuit's decision in Texas Gulf Sulphur).
148. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658.
149. Id. at 659.
150. Id. at 666. Three years after O'Hagan, the SEC codified the Court's complementary approaches to
insider trading liability in Rule 10b5-1, which sets out a general principle that the "manipulative and deceptive
devices" prohibited by Section 10(b) and Rule I Ob-5 shall include, among other things, securities trading "on the
basis of material nonpublic information ... in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed ... to the issuer
of that security or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source of the material nonpublic
information." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(a) (2016).
151. Pritchard, supra note 146, at 32-34.
152. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). The Wall Street Journal reporter in Carpenter had
misappropriated confidential information from his "Heard on the Street" columns by tipping others to trade and
secretly sharing in the profits. Id. at 22-23.
153. Pritchard, supra note 146, at 33.
154. See id. at 58 (reprinting Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.'s Draft Dissent from Denial of Certiorari,
Carpenter v. United States (Dec. 10, 1986)). According to Justice Powell, "the duty of an individual to his
employer alone is insufficient to support an action under Rule lOb-5." Id. Thus, Section 10(b) "'must instead focus
on the petitioner's relationship with the sellers of the ... securities."' Id.
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Justice Powell would have sided with the three O'Hagan dissenters who rejected the
misappropriation theory, 155 and likely would have shared their view that while the attorney
deceived his law firm and his client, such a fraud on the information's source was not
sufficiently "integral" to the securities transactions to fall within the prohibition of Rule
10b-5. 156 Justice Powell may likewise have shared the O'Hagan dissenters' skepticism as
to "whether removing that aspect of fraud.., has anything to do with the confidence or
integrity of the market." 
157
B. Tippers as Misappropriators
Because the attorney in O 'Hagan used his law firm's confidential client information
to procure securities trading profits for himself, an additional step must be undertaken to
appreciate why tipping and trading on misappropriated information is likewise a fraud that
violates Rule 1 Ob-5. As then-Second Circuit Judge Sonia Sotomayor recognized in United
States v. Falcone, 158 "the coincidence of a securities transaction and breach of duty" is not
present where a tipper conveyed confidential information to a third party but did not
himself trade. 159 She emphasized, however, that "O'Hagan did not purport to set forth the
sole combination of factors necessary to establish the requisite connection in all contexts"
and observed that Second Circuit courts had applied the misappropriation theory even to
schemes involving nontrading tippers. 160 Then-Judge Sotomayor also recognized that
"O'Hagan's requirement that the misappropriated information 'ordinarily' be valuable due
to 'its utility in securities trading' appears to be a more generally applicable factor in
determining whether section 10(b)'s 'in connection with' requirement is satisfied."'1 6 1
Thus, in a case against a fiduciary-tipper, the government is "simply required to prove a
breach by ... the tipper, of a duty owed to the owner of the misappropriated
information."' 162 And in a case against the tippee, the government must prove those
elements as well as the tippee's "knowledge that the tipper had breached the duty." 1
63
The Ninth Circuit in Salman had little to say about the decision in O'Hagan, but that
fact is hardly surprising. As the court saw it, the personal benefit test set out in Dirks
applied to misappropriation cases as well as to the classical theory. 164 And once it
concluded that Maher intended to give Michael the "gift" of confidential information
misappropriated from Citigroup's clients, its analysis under Dirks was complete. Had the
Ninth Circuit discussed O'Hagan in any detail, that analysis would have only bolstered the
court's conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Salman's Rule lOb-5
155. See supra note 137.
156. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 691 (1997) (Thomas, J., Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also
id. at 679 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (contending that under the "principle of lenity," Section 10(b)'s text "must be
construed to require the manipulation or deception of a party to a securities transaction").
157. Id. at 691 (Thomas, J., Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
158. United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2001).
159. Id. at 233.
160. Id. (citing United States v. McDermott, 245 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2001)) (finding sufficient evidence to
support jury's conviction of a nontrading tipper, an investment banking executive, who disclosed confidential
information for trading purposes to a woman with whom he was having an affair).
161. Id. at233.
162. Id. at 234.
163. Falcone, 257 F.3d at 234.
164. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1092 n.4 (9th Cir. 2015).
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conviction as a co-participant in Maher's deceptive breach of the duty of loyalty owed to
the sources of the information.
The Second Circuit in Newman, however, committed a serious error when it reversed
the hedge fund managers convictions based solely on its reading of Dirks, without regard
for the decision in O'Hagan. Specifically, in redefining the scope of Dirks's personal
benefit test for joint tipper-tippee liability, the Newman court neglected to consider the
important policy objectives from O'Hagan that militate against such a restrictive
interpretation of the Rule lOb-5 prohibition. Instead of focusing on the ways in which
tipping and trading undermine investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of securities
markets, the Second Circuit harkened back to Justice Powell's preference for promoting
informational "efficiency in the nation's securities markets." 165 Newman went so far as to
reference a property-rights rationale for the insider trading prohibition, 166 notwithstanding
O'Hagan's failure to endorse it and its incongruity with the zones of interest of federal
securities regulation. 167 The Newman decision also quoted a statement from Judge Ralph
Winter (who was one of the three judges on the panel) reflecting a view he expressed 25
years ago that "' [e]fficient capital markets .... require that persons who acquire and act
on information about companies be able to profit from the information they generate."' 168
Since O'Hagan came after Dirks, and undoubtedly trumps Judge Winter's opinion in
Chestman, the Second Circuit should have evaluated the jury's findings in light of the
policy concerns set out in Justice Ginsburg's opinion.
Had Newman done so-that is, had the Second Circuit seriously considered "the
inhibiting impact on market participation of tradin, on misappropriated information, and
the congressional purposes underlying § 10(b)" 69-the court may have been more
compelled to accept the jury's finding that the insiders at Dell and NVIDIA had
"intentionally breached th[eir] duty of trust and confidence by disclosing material
nonpublic information for their own benefit." 170 Indeed, to paraphrase O'Hagan, it would
165. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 449 (2d Cir. 2014).
166. See id. (citing United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 578 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). As his opinion in Chestman makes clear, Judge Winter's views were influenced
substantially by then-Professor, now-Judge Frank Easterbrook's scholarship. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 572, 576
(crediting Easterbrook for the development of the "business-property rationale for banning insider trading" and
quoting from his article, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of
Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REv. 309); see also JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS,
AND POLICY 67 (1991) ("[T]he only conceivable justification for banning insider trading is that such trading
involves the theft of valuable corporate property from its rightful owner.").
167. See Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information - A Breach in Search of a Duty,
20 CARDOzO L. REv. 83, 113 (1998) ("The easiest criticism of the property rights theory is that when Congress
passed and subsequently amended the Exchange Act, it was concerned about fairness and the protection of
investors, not the protection of property rights in information .... ").
168. Newman, 773 F.3d at 449 (quoting Chestman, 947 F.2d at 578) (Winter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). A property rights rationale for the regulation of insider trading also has roots in the Second
Circuit's decision that first endorsed a misappropriation alternative to Chiarella's classical theory: United States
v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd after remand, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
863 (1983). See Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules against Insider
Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 9, 27 n.96 (1984) (noting that the Second Circuit's endorsement of the
misappropriation theory "relie[d] squarely on a property theory to find liability under [Rule] 10b-5").
169. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 659 (1997).
170. Newman, 773 F.3d at 444; see also supra text accompanying note 96 (quoting jury instructions).
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make "scant sense to hold an insider a § 10(b) violator if he" tips confidential information
to a meaningfully close friend or relative in exchange for a tangible benefit "but not if' that
insider intentionally gives away entrusted information to a casual friend to advantage her
over other traders in the market. 171 Newman's unduly narrow interpretation of Dirks's
personal benefit requirement compounded Dirks's restrictive reading of Rule 10b-5 in a
way that produces a disturbing loophole.
Apart from its policy justifications for a broad reading of the Rule lOb-5 insider
trading prohibition, O'Hagan also built on Dirks in a way that facilitates the doctrinal
analysis ofjoint tipper-tippee liability, regardless of whether the tipper stands as an insider
or an outsider to the securities issuer. Although O'Hagan depicted its misappropriation
theory as a "complement" to the classical theory, there is no reason for eschewing a
misappropriation analysis simply because an insider-tipper owes disclosure duties to the
corporation's shareholders as well the corporation that entrusted him with the information.
Indeed, as other securities scholars have observed, "[v]irtually all cases that could be
brought [under the classical theory] can also be styled as 'misappropriation' cases." 172
Because Newman recognized that "[t]he elements of tipping liability are the same,
regardless of whether the tipper's duty arises under the 'classical' or the 'misappropriation'
theory,"' 173 its narrow interpretation of the personal benefit requirement might have
resulted from a misappropriation analysis as well. 174 On the other hand, had the court
conceptualized the Rule lOb-5 fraud as one that was also perpetrated on Dell and NVIDIA,
171. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at689.
172. DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT & PREVENTION § 6.1
(West vol. 18,2015); see also WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC 1. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 492 (3d ed. 2010)
("[I]n most instances, both the Commission and private plaintiffs could recast a classical special relationship cases
as involving misappropriation."). There is at least one, albeit rare, scenario whereby the classical theory would
capture insider trading that would not also violate the misappropriation theory: although an insider's full
disclosure to the corporation would negate liability under the misappropriation theory, it would not absolve the
"classical" disclosure duties owed to the shareholders on the other side of the insider's securities transaction. Of
course, to provide defendants with fair notice of the claims against them, the government should be clear in
articulating its litigation position. See SEC v. Bauer, 42 F. Supp. 3d 923, 930 (N. D. Ill. 2014) (granting
defendant's motion for summary judgment in part because the SEC's initial decision to frame its case solely under
the classical theory-and its failure to raise the misappropriation theory at any time "in the eight years that [the]
case remained pending"-precluded the SEC from substituting theories), on remand from, 723 F.3d 758 (7th Cir.
2013). Although both Bauer opinions suggest in places that the misappropriation theory applies exclusively to
outsiders, no court has held that explicitly. See LANGEVOORT, supra, at § 6.1 (stating that "[t]he better reading
of the case law is that either or both theories may apply, so long as the required elements fit the case").
173. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 446 (2d Cir. 2014) (referencing SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276,
285-86 (2d Cir. 2012)).
174. Although the government has argued on occasion that Dirks's personal benefit test applies only in
classical theory cases, no post-O 'Hagan court has accepted that argument. See SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 286
(2d Cir. 2012) (holding that Dirks's personal benefit test for joint tipper-tippee liability also "governs in a
misappropriation case"); see, e.g., SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2003) (requiring the
government to "prove that a misappropriator expected to benefit from the tip" and observing that "O'Hagan
explicitly states or implicitly assumes that a misappropriator must gain personally from his trading on the
confidential information"). Both the DOJ and SEC attempted to resurrect that argument in the wake of Newman,
but it was flatly rejected. See United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d. 1087, 1092 n.4 (9th Cir. 2015) (ruling that the
personal benefit test applies in misappropriation theory cases "like the instant case"); SEC v. Payton, 97 F. Supp.
3d 558, 563 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2015) (acknowledging that the SEC's argument may have "abstract merits," but
adhering to Obus and Newman's conclusion that the elements of tipping liability are identical, regardless of
whether the tipper's duty arises under the classical or the misappropriation theory).
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the insiders' lack of any legitimate corporate purpose for their repeated instances of
disclosure may have given the court more pause. Indeed, as the Seventh Circuit observed
in SEC v. Maio,175 absent some "legitimate reason" for the insider's disclosure, the
inference that information was "improper[ly] gift[ed]" may be "unassailable." 176 The Maio
case also emphasized that a misappropriator's personal benefit-that is, his or her self-
serving use of a principal's information--can be shown whether the tip is deemed a quid
pro quo or simply a gift to a trading relative or friend. 177 No court, prior to Newman, has
gone so far as to hold that an inference of gift-giving is permissible only in the context of
a "meaningfully close personal relationship" and then only when the misappropriator
expected a tangible benefit. 178
C. Classical Insiders Viewed Under a Misappropriation Lens
As the Court itself recognized in Bateman Eichler, including a misappropriation
charge in a classical tipper-tippee insider trading case can be accomplished simply by a
determination on the part of the government to identify the entrusting corporation as an
additional victim of the fraudulent deception. 179 That is, building on the trial court's
175. SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 633 (7th Cir. 1995) ("After all, [the tipper] did not have to make any
disclosure, so why tell [the initial tippee] anything?").
176. Id. at 633.
177. Id. at 632 (citing Dirks and emphasizing the district court's finding that the tipper's disclosure "was an
improper gift of inside information to... a trading friend"). Newman's demand for evidence of a "meaningfully
close personal relationship" also imposes a higher evidentiary standard for gift-giving than SEC Rule 10b5-2
imposes to justify a finding of a "relationship of trust or confidence." That is, Rule 10b5-2 provides a non-
exclusive list of three situations in which a person has "a duty of trust or confidence" for purposes of the
misappropriation theory: (1) when the person receiving the information "agrees to maintain [that] information in
confidence;" (2) when the persons involved in the communication "have a history, pattern, or practice of sharing
confidences" that results in a reasonable expectation of confidentiality; and (3) a rebuttable presumption is
provided when the person receives such information from a "spouse, parent, child or sibling." 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b5-2 (2016). Newman's exacting criteria for gratuitous tipping is instead reminiscent of the high hurdles
some states place upon shareholders seeking to challenge the independence of a director. See Lisa M. Fairfax,
The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REv. 127, 147-48 (2010) (observing that "even lengthy
friendships or professional interactions among directors are not alone given serious consideration when analyzing
a director's independence").
178. The case that is closest is SEC v. Maxwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d 941 (S.D. Ohio 2004), a classical theory
decision which granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court placed the burden on the SEC
to show precisely how and why a corporate executive stood "to gain" from disclosing highly confidential
information about an upcoming merger to his barber, whom he had known for fifteen years. Id. at 948-49.
Although the court acknowledged that "the requisite personal benefit may be shown by the intent to provide a gift
to benefit the tippee," it nonetheless concluded that "there is absolutely no evidence that [the insider] had any
reason or intent to give a gift-especially a gift of this magnitude to [his barber]." Id. at 949. The court seemed
to place much emphasis on the "parties relative stations in life." Id. at 948. But had Maxwell focused instead on
the lack of legitimate reasons for a corporate executive's disclosure of confidential merger-related information to
his barber, the court may well have found the SEC's asserted inference of gift-giving more compelling. In
addition, Maxwell's result could have been different had the court considered the corporate executive's "'self-
regarding gain,"' which Professor Sung Hui Kim defines as "'supererogatory gain to the individual or her
relatives, friends, or acquaintances."' Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading As Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. REv.
928, 934 (2014). A gain is supererogatory if it is "neither part of the explicit compensation allocated to the
individual nor culturally viewed as an acceptable or unavoidable perquisite of the role." Id. at 956.
179. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 313 (1985) (observing that while an
insider "shares responsibility" in the tippee's Rule 1Ob-5 fraud against individual shareholders, "the insider, in
2016]
The Journal of Corporation Law
instructions to the Newman jury, the DOJ could have sought an additional determination
as to whether the Dell and NVIDIA insiders had "pretend[ed] loyalty ... while secretly
converting the principal's information for personal gain." 180 If the jury had reached an
affirmative answer to this misappropriation question, that conclusion would have
supported a finding that Dell and NVIDIA had been deceived and defrauded by the insiders
and, with proof of their knowledge of that breach of loyalty, their insiders' tippees as co-
participants. To be sure, it would be the rare case where an insider's Rule I Ob-5 liability
would turn (as a matter of law) on a decision to prosecute under one insider trading theory
instead of the other. 181 But there are nonetheless several good reasons for viewing a
classical insider's trading tip to a friend or relative under a misappropriation lens.
First, the framing of a classical insider tipping case in misappropriation terms
facilitates the administration of justice. If the government is not convinced that a classical
insider has misappropriated his corporation's confidential information so that someone else
can profit in securities trading, then the government should not prosecute the insider's
tippee under the classical theory. 182 Based on their arguments for a rehearing and in the
certiorari petition, the prosecutors in Newman appeared convinced that misappropriations
of confidential information occurred. But had the initial prosecution against the remote
tippees been framed around the Dell and NVIDIA insiders' betrayals of trust through
"embezzlement," 183 there almost certainly would have been more evidence introduced at
trial developing the "gift theory" that featured so prominently in the later stages of the
litigation.
Relatedly, viewing insider tipping as an unlawful misappropriation might spur the
SEC and DOJ to take a harsher stance against the gratuitous tippers who betray their duties
of loyalty by giving friends and relatives a securities trading advantage over others in the
market. Indeed, the ruling in Newman pertaining to the insiders' "scant" personal benefits
was likely catalyzed by the government's decision to forego filing any civil or criminal
charges of wrongdoing against the Dell insider and to forgo filing any criminal charges
against the insider at NVIDIA. 184 As Professor Jill Fisch has lamented, the government's
disclosing such information, also frequently breaches fiduciary duties toward the issuer itself').
180. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997); see supra note 96 (quoting the Newman trial
court's instruction that required the jury to determine whether the Dell and NVIDIA insiders had "intentionally
breached [a] duty of trust and confidence by disclosing material, nonpublic information for their own benefit").
181. See supra note 172 (citing sources).
182. A similar principle should apply to juries and courts: absent a finding that an insider has misappropriated
the corporation's information for the purpose of facilitating an outsider's securities trading, there should be no
Rule I Ob-5 liability for the tippee's trading. See Nagy, Fiduciary Principles, supra note 47, at 1347-48 (criticizing
United States v. Evans, 486 F.3d 315 (7th Cir. 2007), a decision in which the court affirmed the criminal
conviction of a tippee who was retried after the insider-friend who allegedly tipped him had been acquitted in the
previous trial).
183. See supra note 141 (referencing O'Hagan's citation to Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27
(1987)).
184. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2014). The NVIDIA tipper ultimately agreed to
settle an SEC enforcement action that charged him with violations of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 as well as
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. Without admitting or denying the allegations, he agreed to be
permanently enjoined from future violations of these provisions and agreed to pay a $30,000 penalty and be barred
from serving as an officer or director of a public company for five years. See Press Release 2014-82, SEC, SEC
Charges Technology Company Insider in California with Tipping Confidential Information Exploited by Hedge
Funds (Apr. 23, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/DetailUPressRelease/1370541624596. The
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decision to aggressively prosecute "the hedge fund end users of inside information" rather
than their tippers may be fueling a perception that disloyal insiders will not be held
"sufficiently accountable" for betraying their duties of trust and confidence. 185 Notably,
the government's inclination to treat end-users of entrusted information more harshly than
the insiders who disclosed that information runs diametrically opposite to the Court's view
in Bateman Eichler that "in the context of insider trading,... a person whose liability is
solely derivative ... [is not] as culpable as one whose breach of duty gave rise to that
liability in the first place."1
86
Conceptualizing gratuitous tipping as an unlawful misappropriation has a third
significant advantage: it will put securities traders (whether first level tippees or others
down a chain) on clearer notice that securities transactions prompted by surreptitious tips
could render them complicit in an insider's fraud on the source of the information.
Although a downstream recipient of a single misappropriated disclosure may have no
reason to believe that the information in his possession was conveyed unlawfully, multiple
instances of highly lucrative leaks transmitted through the same conduit would alert any
reasonable person to the fact that his informational advantage has turned from fortuitous to
nefarious. 187 Thus, tippees like the defendants in Salman and Newman could be viewed as
possibly complicit pawn brokers who resell stolen property: 188 if they know or are reckless
in not knowing that their informational tips were misappropriated in breach of a duty of
loyalty, and if they trade with scienter, they should incur liability under Rule I Ob-5 as a
co-participant in an insider's deception of the information's source. 189
NVIDIA tipper also consented to an order under SEC Rule 102(e) under which he was suspended from appearing
or practicing before the SEC as an accountant for a period of at least five years. See Chris Choi, Exchange Act
Release No. 72494 (June 27, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2014/34-72494.pdf.
185. Jill E. Fisch, Newman Reins in Criminal Prosecution of Remote Tippeesfbr Insider Trading, CLS BLUE
SKY BLOG (January 28, 2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/01/28/newman-reins-in-criminal-
prosecution-of-remote-tippees-for-insider-trading.
186. Bateman Eicher, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Bemer, 472 U.S. 299, 313 (1985) (emphasizing that "insiders
and broker-dealers who selectively disclose material non-public information commit a potentially broader range
of violations than do tippees who trade on the basis of that information"); see also id. at 313 n.23 (observing that
its view on the relative culpability of tippers and tippees "is reinforced" by Congress's recent enactment of ITSA,
"which imposes civil penalties on nontrading tippers out of the belief that, '[a]bsent the tipper's misconduct, the
tippee's trading would not occur' and that a tipper is therefore 'most directly culpable in a violation,"' citing H.R.
REP. No. 98-355, at 9 (1983)).
187. Cf: United States v. Werner, 160 F.2d 438, 441 (2d Cir. 1947) (observing that "[t]he receivers of stolen
goods almost never 'know' that they have been stolen, in the sense that they could testify to it in a court room"
and emphasizing that thieves rarely "admit their theft to the receivers [because] that would much impair their
bargaining power").
188. See SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (observing that the tippee "could only
regard [tipper] as a trafficker in stolen goods"); In the Matters of lnv'rs Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, *11 n.2
(Comm'r Smith, concurring) (equating tippees to those who "knowingly receive stolen goods"); see also Federal
Sentencing Guidelines § 2B1.1 (introductory comment grouping together "basic forms of property offenses: theft,
embezzlement, fraud, forgery, counterfeiting... insider trading, transactions in stolen goods, and simple
property damage or destruction") (emphasis added). Professor Richard Epstein has likewise emphasized that
under a theory of unjust enrichment, "any party who is in possession of stolen information that he knows is not
his" is under a constructive trust to preserve the asset value for its rightful owner. See Richard A. Epstein,
Returning to Common-Law Principles of Insider Trading After United States v. Newman, 125 YALE L.J. 1482,
1506 (2016).
189. Although the defendant in Salman likens gratuitous tipping to the fiduciary misconduct at issue in
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) and McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016), and
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Finally, viewing insider tipping as an unlawful misappropriation widens the scope of
the conduct that constitutes securities fraud under Rule 1Ob-5. That is, because the
deceptive activity turns on the secret betrayal of loyalty that deprives the corporation "of
the exclusive use of [its] information," 191 Rule lOb-5's misappropriation theory could
extend to any deceptive breach of an insider's duty of loyalty, insofar as the breach relates
to an unauthorized disclosure that is shared with others for securities trading purposes. 191
As we shall see, state law has recently experienced a "sea change" with respect to the scope
of the duty of loyalty, 192 and at least under Delaware law, breaches of the duty of loyalty
are no longer limited to instances of self-dealing or other conflicting interests. Breaches of
loyalty can also be shown when a fiduciary deliberately fails to act in good faith, such as
"where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law." 
193
IV. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
When the Supreme Court decided Chiarella and Dirks in the early 1980s, it did so
against a statutory backdrop that directly addressed, through Exchange Act Section
16(b), 194 only a single narrow type of insider trading-namely, the "vicious practices" of
directors, officers, and controlling shareholders who used their positions with the
corporation to "acquire and profit [from] information not available to others" by purchasing
and selling the corporation's stock within a six-month timespan. 195 Although Chiarella's
classical theory construed Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5's proscription of fraud to reach
securities transactions that fell outside of Section 16(b)'s short-swing profit provision,
"absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent," the Court was unwilling to extend
invokes the principle of lenity, those decisions are inapposite. Skilling and McDonnell involved prosecutions
under 18 U.S.C. § 1346, the federal statute that criminalizes "honest services fraud," a concept that implicates
"the due process concerns underlying the vagueness doctrine," when applied to fiduciary misconduct that does
not involve the "seriously culpable conduct" at issue in bribery or kickback cases. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 408, 411.
Tippees like the defendant in Salman are not being punished for securities fraud simply because of their
involvement in, or their enrichment from, fiduciary misconduct. On the contrary, they are being punished for their
knowing or reckless participation in a deception of the source of the misappropriated information, in connection
with securities transactions that "'undermines the integrity of, and investor confidence in, securities markets,"'
United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997). And the Court in O 'Hagan left no doubt that willful trading
on the basis of misappropriated information constitutes a crime under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, as well as a
property-based crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, the federal mail fraud statute. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 677-78
(observing that its rulings on the securities fraud issues require its reversal of the Eighth Circuit's judgment "on
the mail fraud counts as well").
190. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
191. See James J. Park, Rule Job-5 and the Rise of the Unjust Enrichment Principle, 60 DUKE L.J. 345, 409
(2010) (contending that "the Supreme Court's decision in O 'Hagan suggests a doctrinal foundation that can be
modified so that a workable Rule lOb-5 unjust enrichment principle can continue to develop").
192. See Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 457, 464
(2009) ("The past few years have witnessed a sea change in the Delaware courts' understanding of the fiduciary
duty of loyalty.").
193. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (quoting The Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006)).
194. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2011).
195. STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICE, REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, S. REP. No. 73-
1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., at 55 (1934).
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such liability beyond disloyal insiders and their tippees. 196 As Justice Powell expounded
in a letter to Chief Justice Burger, he was confident "that Congress never had the slightest
intention - back in 1933 and 1934 - to extend the Securities Acts to [Chiarella's outsider]
type situation." 197
But the Supreme Court in Salman now has before it the explicit evidence that
Chiarella and Dirks found to be lacking: Congress has enacted three statutes that ratify,
and build upon, the Court's holdings that Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 prohibit insider
trading and tipping. Specifically, Congress added a host of new insider-trading related
provisions to the Exchange Act as part of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984
(ITSA), 19 ' the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988
(ITSFEA), 99 and the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act of
2012. 20 At each juncture, Congress determined to follow the SEC's considered judgment
that insider trading and tipping should continue to be proscribed as fraudulent practices
through interstitial lawmaking, 201 rather than as offenses with new statutorily defined
elements. Thus, while the federal prohibitions of insider trading and tipping may derive
their lineage from judicially implied claims, it is wrong to contend that insider trading is a
judicially-established crime. Chiarella and Dirks merely mark the start of what Professor
Jill Fisch has aptly termed a "lawmaking partnership" among Congress, the Court, and the"
SEC. 202
A. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA)
Although ITSA does not contain an express codification of the Court's antifraud
approach to insider trading liability (that occurred decades later with the STOCK Act's203
amendments to the Exchange Act), ITSA' s principal provisions were clearly predicated
on insider trading as a fraud. Indeed, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce's
Report, 20 4 which is the only written report accompanying ITSA, is replete with references
to Chiarella, Dirks, and lower court precedents. 20 Dirks, however, commanded particular
attention because the Court announced that decision in the midst of ITSA's development.
196. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980).
197. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Chief Jusitce Warren E. Burger 1 (Feb. 4, 1980) (quoted in
Adam C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 52
DUKE L.J. 841, 934 n.568 (2003)).
198. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 78).
199. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677
(1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 78).
200. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, 126 Stat. 291 (2012).
201. Cf United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973) (observing that "the
inevitable incompleteness presented by all legislation means that interstitial federal lawmaking is
a basic responsibility of the federal courts").
202. See Jill E. Fisch, Federal Securities Fraud Litigation as a Lawmaking Partnership, 93 WASH. U.L.
REV. 453, 476 (2015) (depicting "the development of the legal prohibition on insider trading" as "[p]erhaps the
most compelling example of [a] lawmaking partnership").
203. See infra note 264 and accompanying text (quoting STOCK Act).
204. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 1 (1983).
205. See id. at 13 n.20 (identifying civil and criminal actions brought against corporate "outsiders" pursuant
to the misappropriation theory).
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The House Report devotes well over a page to the "impact of Dirks on future Commission
enforcement actions" and reflects the Committee's concern about whether the decision
might limit the SEC's "ability to pursue inside trading cases . . . .206 But the Committee
ultimately opted against a statutory override because it was mollified by Dirks's "unique
facts" as well as the Court's expression of "a continued, firm disapproval of insider
trading." 20 7 The Report thus reflects ITSA's drafters' belief "that if the Dirks decision is
properly and narrowly construed by the courts, the Commission's insider trading program
will not be adversely affected."
20 8
As the legislation's title reflects, ITSA sought to intensify insider trading sanctions,
both criminal and civil, "in order to increase deterrence of violations."' 209 Its drafters
emphasized that "[c]apital formation and our nation's economic growth and stability
depend on investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of our capital markets" and
concluded that insider trading "threatens these markets by undermining the public's
expectations of honest and fair securities markets where all participants play by the same
rules." 210 Seeking to satisfy these deterrence objectives, ITSA increased the maximum
criminal fine for Exchange Act violations from $10,000 to $100,000211 and, for the first
time ever under the Act, authorized court-ordered civil monetary penalties. 212 More
specifically, ITSA's insider trading penalty provision (which is now codified in Section
21 A(a)) authorized the SEC to seek a civil monetary penalty in federal district court of "up
to three times the profit gained or loss avoided" whenever it shall appear to the SEC that
any person has violated any provision of the Exchange Act or rule thereunder "by
purchasing or selling a security ... while in possession of material, nonpublic information"
or by "communicating such information in connection with" a securities transaction. 2 13
The House Report left no doubt that Congress recognized federal prohibitions against
insider trading and tipping, and that it grounded those prohibitions in what it identified as
the Exchange Act's "broad general antifraud provision, section 10(b) and... Rule 1Ob-
5.214
ITSA also amended the Exchange Act to close what was perceived as an options-
trading loophole in the Court's classical theory. Such a loophole arose because options and
other derivative securities are frequently sold by persons who are not also shareholders of
the company that issued the underlying security. 215 As such, purchasing options on the
206. Id. at 14.
207. Id. at 15.
208. Id.
209. H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 1.
210. Id. at 2.
211. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264, (1984) § 3 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 78).
212. Id. at§2.
213. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (2012).
214. H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 4 (observing that since its creation, "the Commission has appropriately used
the antifraud provisions to remedy unlawful trading and tipping by persons in a variety of positions of trust and
confidence who have illegally acquired or illegally used material non-public information"). The Committee also
expressly noted the "broad antifraud remedy under section 14(e)" as well as the SEC's adoption of Rule 14e-3.
Id.
215. See, e.g., Laventhall v. Gen. Dynamics, 704 F.2d 407, 410-11 (8th Cir. 1983) (observing that the
purchase of options "does not represent contribution of capital to the corporation").
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basis of material nonpublic information typically would not trigger a fiduciary-like
disclosure duty owed to the counterparty-seller. 2 16 ITSA plugged this hole by adding a new
Section 20(d) to the Exchange Act, which expressly prohibited insider trading in options
and other derivatives whenever it would be illegal for a person to trade, or communicate
information about, the underlying security. 2 17 Doing so effectively displaced the fiduciary
218principle announced in Chiarella and Dirks, though Section 20(d)'s express statutory
prohibition soon became superfluous when courts began to recognize insider trading in
options as a fraud on the source of entrusted information, and therefore a "primary"
violation of Rule 1 Ob-5 under the misappropriation theory. 
219
Congress's determination to build on top of the Supreme Court's precedents, rather
than start anew with a legislative definition of insider trading, was a well-considered
decision that deserves both acknowledgement and respect. Although ITSA's drafters had
seriously contemplated adding into the bill a provision that would have defined insider
trading (and then revisited that decision in the wake of Dirks), the House Committee
ultimately opted against a statutory definition, in large part out of deference to the SEC's
expert judgment that grounding the offense in existing judicial precedents avoided "the
problems of freezing into law either a definition which is too broad or too narrow to deal
with newly emerging issues." 22° The Committee also took seriously the warning that
"'unscrupulous traders would skirt around any definition constructed.' 22 1 It thus spoke
approvingly of the fact that the government would be pursuing the heightened criminal
fines and the new civil penalties through "case-by-case" judicial interpretations of the
,, ,,222
"broad anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities, and it ultimately concluded that
those "well-developed" interpretations provided "adequate guidance" as to when the
misuse of material nonpublic information would run afoul of the federal insider trading
prohibitions. 223
After the House passed the Committee's bill without objection, the Senate's
216. Id.; see also O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179, 1184-85
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (stating that an option-holder "is owed no special duty by the officers and directors of the
corporation because, quite simply, the corporation is not run for his benefit").
217. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(d) (2011) ("Wherever communicating, or purchasing or selling a security while in
possession of, material nonpublic information would violate, or result in liability to any purchaser or seller of the
security under any provisions of this chapter, or any rule or regulation thereunder, such conduct in connection
with a purchase or sale of a put, call, straddle, option, [or] privilege ... with respect to such security ... shall also
violate and result in comparable liability to any purchaser or seller of that security under such provision, rule, or
regulation.").
218. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 172, § 3-11 (observing that Section 20(d) demonstrates that while
ITSA's drafters "were prepared in some respects to ratify the prevailing tests for insider trading liability, they
believed that, as a policy matter, the Court's rule can result in too narrow a prohibition").
219. The defendant-attomey in O'Hagan, for example, reaped the lion's share of his four million dollars in
profits through options trading based on the material nonpublic information he had misappropriated from his law
firm and its client. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 648 (1997). The Court affirmed his conviction for
violating Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, without once referencing the express statutory prohibition in Section
20(d). Id. at 666.
220. H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 32 (reprinting letter from SEC Chairman John S. R. Shad to the Honorable
Timothy E. Wirth, Chairman, Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance, House
Committee on Energy and Commerce).
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Subcommittee on Securities held hearings on a companion bill that included a statutory
definition of the conduct that would have been subject to ITSA's civil penalty provision.
Although the Subcommittee's Chairman Senator Alfonse D'Amato was a strong proponent
of a statutory definition, his committee took seriously the SEC's concern that a move away
from an antifraud rubric would introduce "new terms and concepts that would generate a
significant amount of litigation" and would limit its flexibility "to deal with future
abuses." 224 As Senator D'Amato explained just prior to the companion bill's passage by a
voice vote in the Senate, "[i]n view of the complexity of the undertaking, and the necessity
for a prompt action on the bill, the committee determined not to include a definition of
insider trading in this legislation. ' 225 The House then accepted the Senate's amendments
to its ITSA bill, thus eliminating the need for a joint conference, and President Ronald
Reagan signed the legislation into law. 226
After ITSA's adoption, Chairman John Dingell and the other members of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce continued to evaluate whether Dirks's test for joint
tipper-tippee liability should be subject to a statutory override. As the House Report
reflects, the Committee directed the SEC to "report back" on how lower courts were
interpreting Dirks and the ways in which the decision's language was being used "by
potential targets and defendants." '227 The SEC's Report, which followed two years later,
assured the Committee that Dirks "had not adversely affected, to a significant degree, the
Commission's enforcement program.' 228 Although it acknowledged that Dirs's demand
for "additional elements of proof' posed some "conceptual challenges" in the development
of its cases, the SEC remained steadfast in its view that successful civil and criminal
prosecutions for insider trading and tipping were continuing under the antifraud parameters
established in Chiarella and Dirks, as supplemented by Rule 14e-3 in tender offer cases
and the misappropriation theory under Rule 1 Ob-5 for outsider trading. 229 The Report also
called the Committee's attention to the Court's opinion in Bateman Eicher,23 ° which the
SEC credited for clarifying some of the principles underlying Dirks and "removing certain
potential ambiguities." 23 1 In the SEC's view, Bateman Eicher's reference to disclosures
"simply to confer 'a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend' 2 32
removed any doubt that such gift-giving would "giv[e] rise to tippee liability without the
necessity of showing that the insider received any additional benefit. ' 233 The SEC Report
224. See CONG. REC. S8912-8913 (June 29, 1984) (remarks of Senator Alfonse D'Amato).
225. Id.
226. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and Its Effect on Existing Law,
37 VAND. L. REv. 1273, 1277-78 (1984) (discussing ITSA's legislative process).
227. H.R. REt'. No. 98-355, at 15 (specifying that the SEC's report should include: "(1) the number of insider
trading cases brought, settled, and tried; (2) the propositions for which counsel cites Dirks in representation of
clients accused of insider trading; and (3) a summary and analysis of lower court decisions citing and interpreting
Dirks").
228. See REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION TO THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY
AND COMMERCE ON DIRKS V. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Aug. 23, 1985) reprinted in
LANGEVOORT, supra note 172, at App. B-I [hereinafter SEC REPORT reprinted in LANGEVOORT].
229. See id., at B-2 to B-3.
230. Bateman Eichler v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985); see supra text accompanying notes 89-94 (discussing
Bateman Eicher).
231. See SEC REPORT reprinted in LANGEVOORT, supra note 228, at App. B-3.
232. Bateman Eicher, 472 U.S. at 319 n.21 (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663-64 (1983)).
233. See SEC Report reprinted in LANGEVOORT, supra note 228, at App. B-1.
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thus confidently predicted that the Bateman Eicher opinion would foreclose certain
arguments made in the past by defense counsel and would "make it unlikely that future
court decisions will interpret Dirks to narrow, to any significant degree, the scope of the
insider trading prohibitions."'234 Had the SEC a crystal ball in 1985 that could have revealed
the Second Circuit's re-interpretation of Dirks in its 2015 Newman decision, the SEC
almost certainly would have delivered to Congress a markedly different report and
recommendation.
B. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA)
Four years after ITSA, Congress reaffirmed its view that "[i]nsider trading damages
the legitimacy of the capital market and diminishes the public's faith" and expressed its
continued support for a robust civil and criminal enforcement program. But that
congressional support need not be merely inferred from the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce's Report or the floor debates leading up to the passage of ITSFEA. Instead,
the Act itself contains express statutory findings that reflect Congress's ratification of the
federal insider trading prohibitions arising under Rule 10b-5 and Rule 14e-3. Specifically,
Congress declared a finding that "[t]he rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange
Commission under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 governing trading while in
possession of material nonpublic, information" satisfy the statutory command that they be
"necessary and appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of investors." 236
Congress further declared that the SEC has "enforced such rules and regulations
vigorously, effectively, and fairly." 237 As Professor Steve Thel has observed, "[gliven the
heat of the debate over how much power Congress has given the SEC to regulate insider
trading, it is remarkable that a statute directly addressed to that issue has been ignored for
all practical purposes." 238 Because that debate has only intensified in the 19 years since
the Court decided O'Hagan, the Salman case provides an important opportunity for it to
acknowledge ITSFEA's findings as well as Congress's essential role in the development
of insider trading jurisprudence.
ITSFEA contained several important provisions that amended the Exchange Act by:
raising the maximum criminal penalties under Section 32(a) from a fine of $100,000 and/or
five years in prison, to a fine of $1 million and/or ten years in prison; 239 modifying ITSA's
234. Id.
235. H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 8 (1988); see also id. at 7-8 (emphasizing that "the small investor will be-
and has been-reluctant to invest in the market if he feels it is rigged against him").
236. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, §2(1), 102 Stat.
4677 (1988).
237. Id. at § 2(2).
238. Steve Thel, Statutory Findings and Insider Trading Regulation, 50 VAND. L. REv. 1091, 1095 (1997),
However, as Professor Thel observes, the O'Hagan Court did not have to rule on the effect of ITSFEA's findings
"because it decided the case before it in the way the findings dictated." Id. at 1116; see United States v. O'Hagan,
521 U.S. 642, 666 n. 11(1997) (observing that because it "upheld the misappropriation theory on the basis of §
10(b) itself [it] need not address ITSFEA's relevance"); id. at 677 n.22 (observing that because it upheld "Rule
14e-3(a) on the basis of § 14(e) itself [it] need not address ITSFEA's relevance").
239. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 4, 102 Stat.
4677 (1988). In 2002, these maximum criminal penalties were again increased with the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1106, 116 Stat. 745 (2002), and Section 32(a) of the Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a), currently provides for fines of not more than $5 million and/or imprisonment of not more
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penalty provision to clarify that tippers may be subject to civil penalties for any tippin
activity that involves a violation of the law, irrespective of the tippee's liability;
extending the civil penalty provision to "controlling persons" who recklessly disregard the
likelihood that an employee or agent is engaging in illegal tipping or trading; 24 1 requiring
that broker-dealers and investment advisers establish, maintain, and enforce written
policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent the misuse of material, nonpublic
information; 242 initiating a "bounty" program giving the SEC discretion to reward
informants providing valuable information in insider trading cases; 243 and establishing an
express private right of action for investors who traded contemporaneously with a person
found to have violated an Exchange Act provision or rule by "by purchasing or selling any
• • • 244
security while in possession of material, nonpublic information," or for unlawfully
communicating such information to a person who uses it to trade.
245
The express right of action for contemporaneous traders, which ITSFEA codified at
Section 20A of the Exchange Act, reflected another determination by Congress to depart
from the fiduciary principle at the core of Chiarella and Dirks. As the House Report
explained, Section 20A was "specifically intended to overturn court cases which have
precluded recovery for plaintiffs where the defendant's violation is premised upon the
misappropriation theory." 24 6 The House Report pointed in particular to the Second
Circuit's decision in Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc.24 7 which, notwithstanding the prior
criminal convictions of the defendants for illegal insider trading and tipping, affirmed a
district court's dismissal of a Rule 1Ob-5 damage action brought by former shareholders of
a tender offer target. 248 ITSFEA's drafters clearly disagreed with the Second Circuit's
conclusion that such contemporaneous traders should not be able to ride "'piggyback upon
the duty owed by defendants"' to their investment bank employers who were advising the
acquiring companies. 249 Notably, Section 20A embodies the position that Chief Justice
Burger articulated in his Chiarella dissent: that a person who misappropriates information
owes by virtue of that fact an affirmative duty of disclosure to the parties on the other side
of his securities transactions. 250
As with ITSA, the period leading up to the passage of ITSFEA evidences Congress's
serious consideration of the costs and benefits of adding into the bill an express statutory
prohibition against trading securities on the basis of material nonpublic information. Over
than 20 years.
240. See H.R. REP. No. 100-910 at 18 (explaining the necessity of"a technical amendment to ITSA to reflect
more accurately its original intent").
241. Exchange Act § 21A(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(b)(1) (2012).
242. Exchange Act § 15(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(g) (2012); Investment Advisers Act § 204A, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
4a (2012).
243. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act, § 3(a)(2).
244. Exchange Act § 20A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(a) (2012).
245. Exchange Act § 20A(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(c) (2012).
246. H.R. REP. No. 100-9 10 at 26.
247. Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983).
248. Id. at 9 n.6.
249. Id. at 13 (quoting Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1353 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
250. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 172, § 9.7; see also infra text accompanying notes at 386-404 (discussing
Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Chiarella and proposing a unified and expanded theory of insider trading that is
premised on "fraud on contemporaneous traders").
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the period from 1986 to 1988, Congress held four sets of hearings devoted to the topic of
insider trading regulation and considered multiple proposals for statutory definitions.
251
But while ITSFEA's drafters continued to be "cognizant of the importance of providing
clear guidelines for behavior which may be subject to stiff criminal and civil penalties, 252
they ultimately concluded that the legal principles were "well-established and widely-
known," and that "a statutory definition could potentially be narrowing, and in an
unintended manner facilitate schemes to evade the law."
25 3
Along the way, however, when the misappropriation theory appeared in jeopardy of
being struck down by a possible five-justice majority, 254 the movement for an express
statutory prohibition picked up steam. Consensus in the Senate began to build around a
proposed bill entitled the "Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987."255 The bill, as it was
later reconciled with an alternative version submitted by the SEC, proposed adding a new
Section 16A to the Exchange Act, making it unlawful:
[F]or any person, directly or indirectly, to purchase, sell or cause the purchase or
sale of, any security, while in possession of material, nonpublic information
relating thereto (or relating to the market therefor), if such person knows (or
recklessly disregards) that such information has been obtained wrongfully, or
that such purchase or sale would constitute a wrongful use of such
information. 
256
However, when the Court's 4-4 affirmance in Carpenter v. United States left the
25721misappropriation theory intact, the apparent need for a statutory definition subsided.2 58
Congress and the SEC soon returned to the view that insider trading jurisprudence could
better develop through interstitial lawmaking in the context of civil and criminal
prosecutions for violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5, as well as Section 14(e) and
Rule 14e-3 in cases involving tender offers.
251. See Thomas W. Joo, Legislation and Legitimation: Congress and Insider Trading in the 1980s, 82 IND.
L.J. 575, 576 (2007) (discussing a Congress that was "preoccupied with insider trading").
252. H.R.REP.No. 100-910at 11(1988).
253. Id.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 151-54 (discussing the grant of certiorari in Carpenter v. United
States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987)).
255. S. 1380, 100th Cong. (1987). The bill was introduced by Senators Donald Riegle and Alfonse D'Amato
based on recommendations by a committee of securities-law practitioners headed by Harvey Pitt, who many years
later became Chair of the SEC. Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look
at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. REG. 149, 227-28 n.332 (1990).
256. S. 1380, 100th Cong. ("Reconciliation Draft," dated November 19, 1987), reprinted in Symposium:
Defining Insider Trading, 39 ALA. L. REV. 531 app. at 554 (1988). The statutory definition of "wrongful"
extended to information that "'has been obtained by, or its use would constitute, directly or indirectly, (A) theft,
bribery, misrepresentation, espionage (through electronic or other means) or (B) conversion, misappropriation, a
breach of any fiduciary duty, any personal or other relationship of trust and confidence, or any contractual or
employment relationship."' Id.
257. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987) (stating that "[tlhe Court is evenly divided with
respect to the convictions under the securities laws and for that reason affirms the judgment below on those
counts").
258. Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 255, at 236 (observing that "when there was no longer any compelling fear
that the courts would require such legislation, the Proscriptions Act faded from public attention, and Congress
turned to other legislative proposals more directly supportive of the Commission's program").
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C. The Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act of 2012
The STOCK Act codified for the first time an explicit legislative recognition that the
Exchange Act encompasses insider trading prohibitions that arise under Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5. 259 The Act also reflects Congress's recent judgment that interstitial lawmaking
by federal courts continues to be an effective means of regulating the misuse of material
nonpublic information in connection with securities trading-whether that information
emanates from inside or outside of the government.
The momentum that fueled the STOCK Act's landslide votes of 96-3 in the Senate
and 417-2 in the House 26 grew out of a claim in a 60 Minutes broadcast that congressional
insider trading was "perfectly legal." 26 1 To quell the public's outcry, Congress quickly
held hearings on proposed bills seeking to ban the purported practice, and in the span of
a few short months, passed legislation that President Obama signed into law in April 2012.
As the Senate Report reflects, although the STOCK Act's drafters recognized that a federal
court could theoretically apply misappropriation theory analysis if it were presented with
a prosecution involving congressional insider trading, they were uncertain as to whether
"the unique nature of an elected office of Congress ... [would] give[] rise to a fiduciary-
like duty owed ... to anybody." 263 The STOCK Act addressed this uncertainty by adding
new provisions to the Exchange Act-Section 21 A(g) and Section 21 A(h)-which provide
that "solely for the purposes of the insider trading prohibitions arising under this Act,
including section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 thereunder," all federal officials, including
members of Congress, owe "a duty arising from a relationship of trust and confidence" to
the United States government and its citizens with respect to material nonpublic
information obtained in connection with their government service. 264 Prior to these
amendments to the Exchange Act, the federal insider trading prohibitions arising under
Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 had been rooted solely in a judicially implied claim. Thus,
the STOCK Act made explicit what Congress had previously ratified through its enactment
of ITSA and ITSFEA.
But the STOCK Act's amendments to the Exchange Act are important for a second
259. STOCK Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105 §§ 4(a), 9(b), 126 Stat. 291 (2012) (affirming that members of
Congress and congressional employees, as well as all officers and employees in the executive and judicial
branches of the federal government, "are not exempt from the insider trading prohibitions arising under the
securities laws, including Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5 thereunder"); id.
at §§ 4(b), 9(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-l(g)(l) and (h)(1) (2012)).
260. Robert Pear, Insider Trading Ban for Lawmakers Clears Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/politics/insider-trading-ban-for-lawmakers-clears-congress.html.
261. See Congress: Trading Stock on Inside Information, 60 MINUTES (June 11, 2012),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-57323527/congress-trading-stock-on-inside-information/ (stating in
the episode summary: "[flor now, the practice is perfectly legal, but some say it's time for the law to change").
262. See Insider Trading and Cong. Accountability: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Gov't Affairs, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter Senate STOCK Act Hearings]; The Stop Trading on Cong.
Knowledge Act: Hearing on H.R. 1148 Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter
House STOCK Act Hearings].
263. See S. REP. No. 112-244, S. 2038 114th Cong. (2012), at 5 (stating that "the Committee agrees with
Professor Langevoort's explanation of clarifying that the insider trading provisions apply to Members of
Congress").
264. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-l(g)(1) and (h)(l) (2012). Section 21A(g) further specifies that members of Congress
and congressional employees owe that duty to Congress itself. 15 U.S.C.§ 78u-l(g)(1).
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reason: they reinforce insider trading law's collaborative nature by expressly
"incorporat[ing] the fiduciary duty approach reflected" in Chiarella, Dirks, and
O'Hagan.265 Prior bills leading up to the legislation had sought to resolve the controversy
by amending the Exchange Act to include an outright statutory proscription against
congressional insider trading. 266 But the STOCK Act's drafters ascribed to the "duty of
trust and confidence" approach as a means of ensuring "that the insider trading prohibitions
apply to Members of Congress in the same way that they apply to everyone else" and to
leave unaltered "the construction of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws [and] the
authority of the SEC or DOJ under those provisions." 267 Although Congress could have
used the 60 Minutes-generated controversy to enact an express statutory prohibition of
insider trading and tipping that would apply to the entire investing public (including its
own members), 268 SEC officials once again cautioned against the adoption of a statutory
proscription, 269 and other witnesses proffered similar advice.
270
As the foregoing Sections demonstrate, in the 36 years since Justice Powell authored
the decision in Chiarella, Congress has hardly been silent as to the scope of the federal
prohibitions against insider trading and tipping. To the contrary, the legislative
developments reflected in ITSA, ITSFEA, and the STOCK Act evidence concerted
congressional judgments rendered only after repeated consultations with securities law
scholars and practitioners, and more importantly, with the expert agency officials at the
SEC. These judgments confirm Congress's multiple determinations that the fraud-based
rubric-and the interstitial lawmaking that is a necessary function of that rubric-puts
securities traders on sufficient notice that securities transactions based on misappropriated
information will be subject to stiff monetary fines and harsh criminal penalties.271 And
notwithstanding several recent bills introduced by individual members of Congress, 272 and
265. See Fisch, supra note 202, at 480.
266. See Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading, Congressional Officials, and Duties of Entrustment, 91 B.U. L.
REv. 1105, 1130-37 (2011) (critiquing prior versions of the STOCK Act).
267. S. REP. No. 112-244, at9(2011-2012).
268. See House STOCK Act Hearings, supra note 262, at 97 (prepared statement of Professor Donna Nagy
highlighting the proposed Insider Trading Proscription Act of 1987 and emphasizing that "much could be gained
from dusting off that proposal and reconsidering it in light of the insider trading jurisprudence that has developed
over the last 25 years"); Senate STOCK Act Hearings, supra note 262, at 65.
269. House STOCK Act Hearings, supra note 262, at 25 (testimony of SEC Director of Enforcement Robert
Khuzami) (expressing concern about "the dangers that would flow from a general statutory prohibition that
attempted to cover the entire field of insider trading").
270. Senate STOCK Act Hearings, supra note 262, at 15 (testimony of Professor John C. Coffee, Jr.
expressing concern about "conflicts in the circuits" because "legislation with new terms" will prompt federal
courts to "spend 10 to 15 years resolving what those new terms mean"); see also id. ("[Ilf you try to adopt
comprehensive legislation, I am afraid that every special interest group in the United States will want a safe harbor
for what they do, and you will find that the statute will go from short to page after page of proposed safe harbors.").
271. See supra note 189 (differentiating the misappropriation theory endorsed in O'Hagan from the due
process concerns that prompted the holding in Skilling).
272. Since the decision in Newman, several members of Congress have introduced bills that would define
the offense of insider trading and eliminate entirely the personal benefit requirement in tipper-tippee cases. See,
e.g., The Stop Illegal Insider Act, S. 702, 114th Cong. (2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/ll4th-
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a plethora of prior suggestions from securities law scholars. 273 Congress has not shown a
willingness to reconsider its prior determinations that insider trading is best regulated as a
species of securities fraud.
V. REGULATION FD
As publicly traded companies, both Dell and NVIDIA are subject to the requirements
and prohibitions in Regulation FD.274 Yet remarkably, the Newman court never once
mentioned this regulation nor the legal constraints that it placed on Dell's and NVIDIA's
insider-tippers. This omission is all the more striking because Regulation FD, throughout
the last 15 years, has regulated the very space that Dirks sought to create-and the Second
Circuit sought to expand-for insider-analyst communications. 275  This myopia
substantially undermined Newman's conclusion that gratuitous tipping, and trading on such
tips, does not amount to a violation of Rule lOb-5.
A. Regulation FD's Purpose and Scope
As other securities law scholars have recounted, the SEC adopted Regulation FD to
navigate around the personal benefit hurdle that Dirks had erected in tipper-tippee insider
trading cases. 276 Over the decade prior, the SEC became increasingly concerned that
corporate executives were routinely providing securities analysts and professional
investors with material nonpublic information pertaining to their companies, including
advance notice of earnings announcements, product developments, and corporate
reorganizations. 277 The agency found this practice of selective disclosure blatantly unfair
congress/senate-bill/702/text (introduced by Senators Jack Reed (D-RI) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ)); The Ban
Insider Trading Act of 2015, H.R. 1173, 114th Cong. (2015) (introduced by Rep. Steven Lynch (D-MA),
https://www.congress.gov/1 14/bills/hrl 173/BILLS-1 14hrl 173ih.pdf; H.R. 1625, The Insider Trading Prohibition
Act (2015) (introduced by Reps. Jim Himes (D-CT), Steve Womack (R-AR) and Emanuel Cleaver (D-MO)),
https://www.congress.govibillI 14th-congress/house-bill/1625the.
273. See supra note 268 and accompanying text (quoting STOCK Act testimony); see also Henning, supra
note 54, at 773-76 (pointing out the benefits of an insider trading prohibition that would turn on the possession
of material nonpublic information, akin to the abstain or disclose approach in Rule 14e-3); Jill E. Fisch, Start
Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 236, 239 (1991)
(suggesting that "regulation of insider trading would be improved by reclassifying such trading as a regulatory
violation rather than a crime" and proposing a statute that focuses on insiders "who are in a position to control
corporate disclosure"); Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice ofInsider
Trading, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1339, 1338-39 (1991) (proposing statutory language "that eliminates the
intellectual awkwardness of the prevailing fiduciary basis for the duty to disclose to marketplace traders, the Dirks
'personal benefit' test.., and the cramped nature of the misappropriation theory").
274. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2011).
275. See Robert B. Thompson & Ronald King, Credibility and Information in Securities Markets after
Regulation FD, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 615, 634 (2001) (concluding that "the effect of Regulation FD is to redraw
the line regarding what transfers of information are permissible").
276. See Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst As Agent: Rethinking the Regulation of
Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REv. 1035, 1061 (2003) (observing that "the Supreme Court's decisions in Chiarella and
Dirks created a privileged status for analysts with respect to insider trading regulation").
277. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Release Nos. 33-7881, 34-43154, [2000 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 86,319, at 83,692, 83,677 (Aug. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Regulation FD Adopting
Release]; see also Fisch & Sale, supra note 276, at 1062 (observing that the problem of selective disclosure "took
on increased urgency as market volatility increased in the late 1990s" and as evidence mounted that "a substantial
[Vol. 42:1
Beyond Dirks: Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading
because "those who were privy to the information beforehand were able to make a profit
or avoid a loss at the expense of those kept in the dark."' 278 The SEC also emphasized the
"close resemblance" between issuer selective disclosure and insider tipping and trading. 279
As the SEC explained:
In both cases, a privileged few gain an informational edge-and the ability to
use that edge to profit-from their superior access to corporate insiders, rather
than from their skill, acumen, or diligence. Likewise, selective disclosure has an
adverse impact on market integrity that is similar to the adverse impact from
illegal insider trading: investors lose confidence in the fairness of the markets
when they know that other participants may exploit "unerodable informational
advantages" derived not from hard work or insights, but from their access to
corporate insiders. 280
But as the SEC rather grudgingly came to recognize, 281 absent the receipt of a personal
benefit by a corporate executive, the Dirks decision allowed valuable corporate information
to be legally dribbled out to securities analysts, who could legally trade securities on the
basis of those selective disclosures or advise their clients to do so. 282 Until the SEC acted
to change that practice, corporate executives could almost always come up with a corporate
purpose for sharing material nonpublic information with securities analysts and other
securities professionals. 
283
Regulation FD, which took effect in October 2000, sought to level the playing field
for ordinary investors by effectively banning the practice of selective disclosure and
thereby thwarting the privileged securities trading that came with it. The SEC did so by
exercising its rulemaking authority under Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act, which
empowers the agency to mandate ongoing disclosure by SEC reporting issuers. 284 The
number of issuers apparently made selective disclosure a regular practice").
278. Regulation FD Adopting Release, supra note 277, at 83,677.
279. Id.
280. Id. (quoting United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) (citing Victor Brudney, Insiders,
Outsiders and Informational Advantages under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 360 (1979)).
281. See Donna M. Nagy & Richard W. Painter, Selective Disclosure by Federal Officials and the Case for
an FGD (Fairer Government Disclosure) Regime, 2012 Wis. L. REv. 1285, 1341-43 (discussing the securities
industry's reaction to the SEC settlement in Phillip J. Stevens, Litigation Release No. 12,813, 48 S.E.C. Docket
739, 739 (Mar. 19, 1991)). The SEC claimed that selective disclosure to a securities analyst satisfied the Dirks
test because the CEO's motivation in making the disclosure was "'to protect and enhance his reputation."' Id. at
1342 (quoting Phillip J. Stevens, Litigation Release, No. 12,813, 48 S.E.C. Docket 739, 739 (Mar. 19, 1991)).
The SEC's position was never tested in court and the settlement sparked an outcry from securities law scholars
and practitioners. The SEC thereafter opted against initiating subsequent Rule lOb-5 litigation to get at the
problem of selective disclosure. Id. at 1343.
282. See Nagy & Painter, supra note 281, at 1292; Stephen J. Choi, A Framework for the Regulation of
Securities Market Intermediaries, 1 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 45, 57 (2004) (contending that the Court in Dirks "was
particularly concerned with giving corporate officers the ability to pass inside information freely to analysts").
283. See Donald C. Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76 VA. L. REv. 1023,
1024 (1990) (observing that selective disclosures to analysts served a variety of corporate ends, "such as to
enhance the company's standing with the investor community or to strengthen pre-existing lines of
communication").
284. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2010). In addition to issuers with a class of securities registered under Exchange
Act Section 12, Regulation FD applies to issuers required to file reports under Exchange Act Section 15(d) and
to closed-end investment companies, but it does not apply to any other investment companies or any foreign
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regulation applies only to disclosures made in the name of the issuer or by "person[s] acting
on [its] behalf," a term that includes senior executives as well as any "investor relations or
public relations officer" or any employee "who regularly communicates" with securities
industry professionals or institutional investors. 285 However, it extends to disclosures made
by those persons only to four categories of recipients:
(1)broker-dealers and their associated persons [including sell-side securities
analysts], (2) investment advisers, certain institutional investment managers and
their associated persons, and (3) investment companies, hedge funds, and
affiliated persons [including buy-side analysts and (4)] ...any holder of the
issuer's securities, under circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that
such person would purchase or sell securities on the basis of the information.
286
Regulation FD also explicitly exempts disclosures made to temporary agents who owe a
duty of loyalty to the issuer (such as attorneys, accountants or other advisers), 287 as well
as to other persons who have "expressly agree[d] to maintain the disclosed information in
confidence." 288 In addition, the regulation specifies that an "officer, director, employee, or
agent of an issuer who discloses material nonpublic information in breach of a duty of trust
or confidence to the issuer shall not be considered to be acting on behalf of the issuer."
289
But for this latter qualification, an insider's illegal tipping in violation of Rule 1Ob-5 would
likewise trigger a Regulation FD violation on the part of the issuer.
Regulation FD's effective ban on "unfair selective disclosure" follows from a
consequence of its rules rather than from an explicit prohibition in its text. 29 Its basic
mandate requires that whenever an issuer or a person acting on its behalf discloses material
nonpublic information to any of the four enumerated categories of recipients, the issuer
must make public disclosure of that same information "simultaneously" for "intentional"
(i.e., knowing or reckless) disclosures, 291 or "promptly" for non-intentional disclosures. 29
2
The clear intent behind the SEC's "simultaneous" disclosure requirement is to prohibit
issuers and their officials from intentionally making selective disclosures to those persons
who are most likely to trade on that information. In other words, Regulation FD puts issuers
and their officials to an "all or nothing choice: they are not required to disclose any more
information than before, but if they tell someone, they must tell everyone." 293 If the issuer
government or foreign private issuer. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(b) (2016).
285. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(c), (f).
286. Regulation FD Adopting Release, supra note 277, at 83,681 (quoting FD Rule 100(b)(1)).
287. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(i).
288. Id. at § 243.100(b)(2)(ii).
289. Id. at § 243.101(c).
290. See Regulation FD Adopting Release, supra note 277, at 83,681 (stating that "Regulation FD...
establishes a clear rule prohibiting unfair selective disclosure").
291. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(a). An "intentional" disclosure occurs when "the person making the disclosure
either knows, or is reckless in not knowing, that the information he or she is communicating is both material and
nonpublic." Id.
292. Id. at § 243.10 1(d). "Promptly means as soon as reasonably practicable (but in no event after the later
of 24 hours or the commencement of the next day's trading on the New York Stock Exchange) after a senior
official of the issuer... learns that there has been a non-intentional disclosure by the issuer or person acting on
behalf of the issuer of information that the senior official knows, or is reckless in not knowing, is both material
and nonpublic." Id.
293. Thompson & King, supra note 275, at 615.
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fails to "tell everyone," the issuer's antifraud liability for material omissions liability is not
affected, 294 but the SEC can bring an enforcement action for the issuer's violations of
Regulation FD and Section 13(a) as well as against the issuer official who caused, or aided
and abetted, those violations. 29 5 Securities analysts may likewise be liable for causing or
aiding and abetting an issuer's Regulation FD violations, in certain instances.
296
Although Regulation FD reflects the SEC's concerted effort to regulate issuers and
their disclosure practices rather than securities investors and their trading, the regulation
was clearly constructed with the troubling practices of securities analysts in mind. The
Final Rule Release made a particularly pointed reference to the "practice of securities
analysts seeking 'guidance' from issuers regarding earnings forecasts," and it cautioned
corporate officials that private discussions with analysts who are seeking guidance about
earnings estimates presents a "high degree of risk under Regulation FD. ''2 97 Favoring
directness to subtlety, the SEC explicitly warned that "[i]f the issuer official communicates
selectively to the analyst nonpublic information that the company's anticipated earnings
will be higher than, lower than, or even the same as what analysts have been forecasting,
the issuer likely will have violated Regulation FD."
' 298
Thus, as Professors Robert Thompson and Ronald King have aptly summarized,
through its adoption of Regulation FD "the SEC has reversed the legal consequences of the
analyst's conduct discussed in Dirks."' 299 Regardless of any possibly positive effect on
pricing efficiency, selective disclosures about earnings results--or any other intentional
transfers of material nonpublic information to securities analysts-are now unlawful, even
if the issuer official is not tipping that information for a personal benefit.
B. The Interplay Between Regulation FD and Gratuitous Tipping
The Second Circuit's failure to consider the post-Dirks development brought about
by the SEC's adoption of Regulation FD substantially undermines Newman's conclusion
that gratuitous tipping and trading on such tips does not constitute a violation of Rule lOb-
5. Regulation FD radically changed the legal landscape for private, one-on-one discussions
between issuer officials (such as the Dell insider, who worked in its investor relations
department) and securities industry professionals (such as his friend/acquaintance, the
294. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (stating that "[n]o failure to make a public disclosure required solely by §
243.100 shall be deemed to be a violation of Rule lob-5 under the Securities Exchange Act").
295. See Regulation FD Adopting Release, supra note 277, at 83,691. As Professor John Coffee points out,
the "willful" violation of an SEC rule is a criminal offense under both the Exchange Act and the Securities Act.
Thus, a corporate executive who willfully violates Regulation FD by engaging in warehousing in advance of a
merger announcement "is seemingly subject to criminal prosecution." John C. Coffee, Jr., Introduction: Mapping
the Future of Insider Trading Law: Of Boundaries, Gaps, and Strategies, 2013 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 281, 311
(2013).
296. See Richard W. Walker, Director of Enforcement, Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Speech before the Compliance
& Legal Division of the Securities Industry Association: Regulation FD - An Enforcement Perspective (Nov. 1,
2000) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch415.htm) (advising that while it would not be
a common occurrence for the SEC to charge an analyst, "comments by an analyst to an issuer along the lines of
'you can tell me, the SEC will never find out' . . . . [would] raise red flags and convey an intention by the analyst
to induce the issuer's violation of FD").
297. Regulation FD Adopting Release, supra note 277, at 83,684.
298. Id.
299. Thompson & King, supra note 275, at 635.
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Neuberger Berman analyst). 3°° Thus, if the insider at Dell did not intentionally tip the
analyst so that he could trade securities (or advise others to trade), that insider likely caused,
or aided and abetted, Dell's violation of Regulation FD. Moreover, virtually all publicly
traded companies now have stringent policies and procedures in place to guard against
Regulation FD violations. 30 1 Such internal policies have sensitized all employees to the
perils of disclosing material nonpublic information (especially earnings-related), even if an
employee (such as the NVIDIA insider, who worked in the finance unit is not a "senior
executive" or otherwise covered by the prohibitions in Regulation FD.
3 "
The Court's decision to consider Newman's personal benefit standard in the context
of the Salman petition opens the door for a new interpretation of Rule lOb-5's insider
trading prohibition that takes full account of Regulation FD. The consequences for the
precedent in Dirks and the controversy over gratuitous tipping are two-fold.
First, against the backdrop of Regulation FD, it now makes little sense to narrowly
interpret the personal benefit element to facilitate what Dirks had viewed as the analyst's
role in "ferret[ing]" out material nonpublic information from an issuer's officials. For
as long as Regulation FD remains on the books-and notwithstanding the studied views of
several distinguished securities law scholars 304-that type of ferreting by securities
analysts is no longer revered by the SEC as "necessary to the preservation of a healthy
market." 305 Thus, Regulation FD has sucked out most of the air from the very space that
300. See supra text accompanying notes 60-63. In view of Newman's ruling that the tippers did not breach
a duty of trust and confidence owed to their employers, the Dell insider would have been a "'person acting on
behalf of an issuer' because he was a person who "regularly communicate[d] with securities industry
professionals," even if he was not an "investor relations officer." 17 C.F.R. § 243.101 (2016).
301. See Jill E. Fisch, Regulation FD: An Alternative Approach to Addressing Information Asymmetry, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING 129 (Stephen M. Bainbridge ed. 2013) (observing that issuers "have
taken seriously the applicable regulatory restrictions in engaging in private communications with investors and
analysts and have structured compliance and education systems to reduce both intentional and unintentional
selective disclosures").
302. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65. Depending on the scope of his duties and the regularity of
his contacts with securities industry professionals or holders of the company's securities, the NVIDIA insider
may have been a "person acting on behalf of an issuer" under Regulation FD, Rule 101 (c).
303. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (quoting Dirks).
304. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33 (discussing amicus brief filed in the Second Circuit by
Professors Bainbridge, Henderson and Macey); see also Epstein, supra note 188, at 1485 (contending that
"Regulation FD places an unfortunate straightjacket on how various firms do business with analysts of their stock"
and arguing that firms "should be allowed to authorize their employees to make selective disclosures of inside
information so long as [their] officers and directors have concluded in good faith that the release of that
information will increase overall firm value"); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate
Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 51 (2002) (contending that "Regulation
FD can be seen as part of a misguided SEC strategy of insider trading regulation that has hobbled markets' ability
to scrutinize corporate misconduct" and concluding that "forcing sharing of information necessarily weakens
incentives to gather and create the information").
305. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983). In addition to the SEC's growing concern about the unfair use
of selectively disclosed information by analysts and their client, see supra notes 278-80 and accompanying text,
technological changes also prompted the SEC to reassess the value of encouraging private conversations between
insiders and analysts. See Michael D. Guttentag, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading: Tipper Wrongdoing
in the 21st Century, 69 FLA. L. REv. (forthcoming 2016) (SSRN draft at 12),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin? abstractjid=2830735 (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659) (pointing out that
Dirks's favorable view toward selective disclosure in 1983 was in part a function of the then-nature of "'this type
of information, and indeed of markets themselves, [whereby] such information [could not] be made
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Dirks created for insider-analyst communications. 306 Newman's narrow reading of Dirks
plainly encourages activity that constitutes a violation of Regulation FD and, in the SEC's
expert judgment, leads to a loss of investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of the
securities markets. 30 7 The notion that courts should interpret Rule 1Ob-5 narrowly to
facilitate an activity that is currently unlawful is both strange and unsettling.
Second, Regulation FD leaves corporate insiders, particularly those in investor
relations or finance departments, with little room for a credible claim that selective
disclosures about earnings information were prompted by a mistaken belief about whether
it "already has been disclosed or that it is not material enough to affect the market."
30 8
Publicly traded companies have been highly proactive in forbidding communications that
could be construed as a leak of material nonpublic information. Such companies likewise
issue frequent and unambiguous warnings pertaining to the confidentiality of pre-
announcement earnings. These admonishments are likely prompted by the SEC's depiction
of these communications as involving a "high degree of risk.'
Thus, before concluding that the circumstantial evidence surrounding the multiple
instances of tipping "was simply too thin" to support the jury's finding of a personal benefit
by the Dell and NVIDIA insiders, 31 the Second Circuit should have drilled down more
deeply into the question of motivation. As the Seventh Circuit recognized in Maio, absent
some "legitimate reason" for the insider's disclosure, the inference that information was
"improper[ly] gift[ed]" may be "unassailable." 3 11 Given the jury's finding of personal
benefits, and Regulation FD's clear prohibition of selective disclosure, gratuitous tipping
for the "ephemeral benefit of the 'value of... friendship,' 3 12 may well have been the
explanation that convinced the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the tippers had violated
the fiduciary duties that they owed to Dell and NVIDIA and that the defendants knew, or
consciously avoided knowing, about their breaches.
3 13
simultaneously available to all of the corporation's stockholders or the public generally').
306. See Pritchard, supra note 34, at 861 ("Powell wanted to leave space for securities professionals to
uncover nonpublic information, even if it came from corporate insiders.").
307. See Donald C. Langevoort, Newman and Selective Disclosure, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 28, 2015),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/01/28/newman-and-seleetive-disclosure/ (expressing concern that
Newman "read[s] almost as a roadmap for selective disclosure"). The panel in Newman drew attention to other
investor relations officials at Dell and NVIDIA who "routinely 'leaked' earnings data in advance of quarterly
earnings." United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 455 (2d Cir. 2014). In the one specific example provided,
Dell's Head of Investor Relations selectively disclosed nonpublic earnings-related information to "establish
relationships with financial firms who might be in a position to buy Dell's stock." Id. The fact that other Dell and
NVIDIA officials may have caused their companies to violate Regulation FD should have heightened the court's
scrutiny of the tips provided by the defendants' original tippers. Newman's view that other instances of selective
disclosure at Dell and NVIDIA somehow mitigate that conduct is troubling, to say the least. Cf Langevoort, supra
(observing that Newman "takes as exculpatory how willing senior types at Dell and NVIDIA were to leak earnings
information" and noting that the court failed to mention "that (if the information was material) that conduct was
a gross violation of Regulation FD").
308. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983).
309. Regulation FD Adopting Release, supra note 277, at 83,684.
310. Newman, 773 F.3d at 451-52.
311. See supra text accompanying note 176 (quoting SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 632 (1995)).
312. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452 (quoting United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2013)).
313. See infra notes 375-79 and accompanying text (discussing Regulation FD's relevance to a tippee's
awareness of an insider-tipper' s lack of good faith). The question of which policy preferences-the SEC's or the
Dirks majority's-should be accorded greater weight in deciding the legality of gratuitous tipping also implicates
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VI. LACK OF GOOD FAITH AND THE DUTY OF LOYALTY
Along with the O'Hagan decision, the Exchange Act amendments (in ITSA, ITSFEA,
and the STOCK Act), and Regulation FD, the Delaware judiciary's expanded notion of the
fiduciary duty of loyalty has an important bearing on insider trading cases involving
gratuitous tipping. Although the insider trading and tipping prohibitions arising under Rule
1Ob-5 implicate federal common law, federal courts often look to state law in determining
whether a fiduciary has breached a duty of trust and confidence by trading securities on the
basis of material nonpublic information, or by disclosing such information to someone else
who used it to trade. As the court observed in United States v. Whitman,314 "general
principles of state fiduciary law ... [can provide] helpful guidance for determining the
parameters of the applicable federal common law to be applied., 315
State fiduciary law can offer particularly valuable guidance on two questions that lie
at the core of Rule lOb-5's prohibition of tipping: 1) [h]ow should a court regard the
careless disclosure of material nonpublic information when a fiduciary does not intend for
securities trading to result and 2) how should a court regard a fiduciary's deliberate action
to disclose entrusted information so that it can be used to provide one or more persons with
a securities -trading advantage? The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in The Walt
Disney Company Derivative Litigation316 has direct relevance to the first question and
Stone v. Ritter3 17 offers an important perspective on the second.
Taken together, both Disney and Stone will provide the Supreme Court in Salman
with a compelling justification for rejecting Newman's restrictive view that tipping violates
Rule 1Ob-5 only when a fiduciary shares entrusted information in the context of "a
meaningfully close personal relationship" when information is exchanged for "a personal
benefit of... some consequence." 318 Moreover, because Stone construes breaches of the
duty of loyalty to include not only self-dealing but also other deliberate actions evidencing
a lack of good faith, the standards from that decision can also provide federal courts with
"objective criteria" in making determinations about whether a tippee "knows or should
know that there has been a breach. ' , 3 19 Indeed, when Justices Powell and Ginsburg
referenced the "duty of trust and confidence" in their respective opinions in Dirks and
O'Hagan, they could not possibly have had in mind the more expansive notion of loyalty
that the Delaware Supreme Court developed in 2006.
core principles of administrative law from decisions including Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352 (2014) (statement by Scalia & Thomas,
JJ) (agreeing with the Court's denial of certiorari, but suggesting that Chevron does not obligate courts to defer
"to an executive agency's interpretation of a law that contemplates both criminal and administrative
enforcement"). Because it is beyond the scope of this (already lengthy) Article, analysis of Chevron deference
issues will be left for another day.
314. United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
315. Id. at 370. Some securities law scholars have advocated for a role for state law that would entail much
more than simply guidance. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the
FederalInsider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1193 (1995) (arguing that such incorporation
"would advance the federalism policies of the federal securities laws, without frustrating any of the other policies
thereof').
316. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
317. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
318. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014).
319. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983).
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A. The Duty ofLoyalty under Delaware Law
State fiduciary law has long distinguished between the duty of care and the duty of
loyalty. 32  In the realm of corporate law, the consequences of this distinction are
particularly important because a fiduciary's violation of the duty of care can be exculpated
and/or indemnified by the corporation, whereas violations of the duty of loyalty cannot.
Delaware law, for example, permits a corporation to eliminate or limit a director's personal
liability for monetary damages "for breach of fiduciary duty as a director," but the
provision will not allow exculpation involving "any breach of the director's duty of loyalty
to the corporation or its stockholders" or "for acts or omissions not in good faith or which
involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law.''32 1 Delaware's
indemnification statute likewise permits a corporation to indemnify its officers and
directors for actions taken "in good faith and in a manner the person reasonably believed
to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation." 3 2 2 Although the precise
wording of such exculpation and indemnification provisions vary from state to state,
Delaware's provisions and the case law that interprets them have tremendous significance
not only because most publicly traded companies are incorporated in Delaware, but also
because many states use Delaware as a guide for developing their own statutes and case
law.
The Disney litigation involved a derivative suit by shareholders against the company's
directors and officers for damages arising out of the hiring and firing of the company's
President, Michael Ovitz. 3 2 3 The shareholders claimed that members of the board of
directors had violated their fiduciary duties by first approving an out-sized compensation
package in Ovitz's employment contract and then, less than a year later, by allowing a no-
fault termination payment that cost the company approximately $130 million. If the
shareholders were successful in proving that these actions by the board were the result of
a lack of good faith, then the damages sought by the shareholders could neither be
exculpated nor indemnified.
Recognizing that the parameters of the duty to act in good faith had been "relatively
uncharted," the Delaware Justices set out in Disney to remedy that deficiency. 324 The court
noted in particular that to adopt "a definition that conflates the duty of care with the duty
to act in good faith by making a violation of the former an automatic violation of the latter,
would nullify those legislative protections and defeat the General Assembly's intent."
325
It thus held explicitly that "[t]here is no basis in policy, precedent or common sense that
would justify dismantling the distinction between gross negligence and bad faith. 326But
the court then provided some much needed guidance as to what a duty to act in good faith
entails:
320. Cf Pritchard, supra note 197, at 942 (recognizing that under Dirks, "the federal common law of insider
trading was brought into line with the traditional distinction in state corporate law between breaches of care and
loyalty").
321. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015).
322. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2011).
323. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 36-46 (Del. 2006).
324. Id. at 64.
325. Id. at 66.
326. Id.
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[T]he universe of fiduciary misconduct is not limited to either disloyalty in the
classic sense (i.e., preferring the adverse self-interest of the fiduciary or of a
related person to the interest of the corporation) or gross negligence. Cases have
arisen where corporate directors have no conflicting self-interest in a decision,
yet engage in misconduct that is more culpable than simple inattention...
[F]iduciary conduct of this kind, which does not involve disloyalty (as
traditionally defined) but is qualitatively more culpable than gross negligence,
should be proscribed. A vehicle is needed to address such violations doctrinally,
and that doctrinal vehicle is the duty to act in good faith.327
The court also provided three examples of deliberate conduct that indisputably evidences
a fiduciary's failure to act in good faith:
A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where the fiduciary
intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests
of the corporation, where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable
positive law, or where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a
known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties. 328
Thus, Disney held not only that "grossly negligent conduct, without more, does not and
cannot constitute a breach of the fiduciary duty to act in good faith." '329 It also made clear
that shareholders could pursue a claim for lack of good faith outside of the standard self-
dealing and conflicts of interest scenarios that are ordinarily implicated by the duty of
loyalty. 330
Less than five months later, in Stone v. Ritter,331 the Delaware Supreme Court
clarified an important doctrinal consequence that follows from a fiduciary's failure to act
in good faith. After reiterating the three examples from Disney of deliberate conduct
evidencing a lack of good faith (one of which was "where the fiduciary acts with the intent
to violate applicable positive law"), 332 the court held explicitly that the obligation to act in
good faith was not a separate stand-alone fiduciary duty. 333 Instead, the fiduciary
obligation to act in good faith is a core component of the duty of loyalty. 334 As the Justices
explained:
[T]he fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to cases involving a financial or
other cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest. It also encompasses cases where
the fiduciary fails to act in good faith. As the Court of Chancery aptly put it in
Guttman, "[a] director cannot act loyally towards the corporation unless she acts
in the good faith belief that her actions are in the corporation's best interest."
335
Thus, the incorporation of a good faith obligation into the duty of loyalty substantially
327. Id.
328. Disney, 906 A.2d at 67.
329. Id. at 65.
330. Gold, supra note 192, at 469.
331. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
332. Id. at 369 (quoting In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006)).
333. Id. at 369 ("[A] failure to act in good faith is not conduct that results, ipso facto, in the direct imposition
of fiduciary liability.").
334. Id. at 370.
335. Id. (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del .Ch. 2003)).
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expanded the circumstances under which successful claims for a breach of the duty of
loyalty might be brought. 336
As the above passage from Stone makes clear, the Delaware Supreme Court's
determination that the duty of loyalty encompasses an obligation to act in good faith echoed
the observation made years before by then-Vice Chancellor (now Delaware Chief Justice)
Leo Strine:
It does no service to our law's clarity to continue to separate the duty of loyalty from
its own essence; nor does the recognition that good faith is essential to loyalty
demean or subordinate that essential requirement... The reason for the disloyalty
(the faithlessness) is irrelevant, the underlying motive (be it venal, familial,
collegial, or nihilistic) for conscious action not in the corporation's best interest does
not make it faithful, as opposed to faithless.337
In Guttman, the court stated plainly that "one cannot act loyally as a corporate director by
causing the corporation to violate the positive laws it is obligated to obey." 338 Of course,
after Disney and Stone, the law is clear that negligent conduct-or even grossly negligent
conduct-that results in the corporation's violation of a federal or state law would not
constitute a deliberate failure to act in good faith. But a fiduciary's intentional violation of
positive law, at least under Delaware law, now violates the duty of loyalty. 
339
B. The Interplay between State Fiduciary Law and Rule 10b-5
When the Salman Court considers the legality of gratuitous tipping, the landmark
decisions in Disney and Stone will, in the words of Whitman, provide "helpful guidance for
determining the parameters" of Rule 1Ob-5's insider trading and tipping prohibitions.
340
Disney's holding that gross negligence by itself cannot evidence a lack of good faith is
coextensive with Dirks's view as to when the disclosure of material nonpublic information
to a person outside the corporation constitutes an unlawful tip. Talking indiscreetly about
confidential information in a crowded train car, 34 1 or even sharing confidential information
with others (including a securities analyst) in a mistaken belief that the information is either
immaterial or already public, 342 implicates actions that are negligent or at most grossly
336. See Gold, supra note 192, at 471. But see Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty's Core Demand: The Defining
Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 695 (2010) (viewing Stone's principal contribution as
one of "doctrinal clarity" that prompts courts to inquire into good faith as "an instrumental way of determining
whether an act of disloyalty was committed").
337. Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003).
338. Id.
339. See Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 934-35 (Del. Ch. 2007) (observing that "Stone clarified one
of the most difficult questions in corporate law-when directors with no motivation to injure the firm can be held
responsible if the corporation incurs serious harm as a result of its failure to obey the law" and emphasizing that
a "knowing use of illegal means to pursue profit for the corporation is director misconduct"). For an argument
that a fiduciary's intentional violation of positive law should be treated separately from the duty of loyalty, see
Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 590-94
(2008).
340. United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
341. See SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 287 (2d Cir. 2012) (hypothesizing careless cellphone user and
eavesdropping passenger).
342. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983).
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negligent. Whistleblowing to expose fraud or corruption at a company likewise does not
evidence a deliberate failure to act in good faith and thus does not constitute a violation of
a fiduciary's duty of loyalty. 343
In sharp contrast, a fiduciary who "acts with a purpose other than that of advancing
the best interests" of his employer 344-such as disclosing entrusted M&A information to
provide one's brother with trading advantage over others in the market-is consciously
failing to act in good faith and is thus violating his duty of loyalty. Likewise, the insiders
at Dell and NVIDIA would have failed to act in good faith, and thereby violated their duties
of loyalty, if they intentionally leaked unreleased earnings information to their friends (or
acquaintances) knowingly or recklessly disregarding the procedures put in place by their
companies to guard against violations of Regulation FD.
Thus, had the Newman court considered the state fiduciary law reflected in Disney
and Stone, it might have reached different results on the tipper's personal benefit issue as
well as the defendants' knowledge issue. The evidence in Newman did not suggest that the
insiders at Dell and NVIDIA had any legitimate reason for repeatedly disclosing
confidential earnings-related information. Nor can it be claimed that the repeated patterns
of disclosures were mere slips of the tongue or that the insiders were unaware of the market-
sensitive nature of their regularized leaks of confidential information. Thus, assuming the
tips by the insiders had been for the "ephemeral benefit of the 'value of [the tippee's]
friendship,"' 345 those tips would have been deliberate actions not in good faith and thereby
an undisclosed breach of their loyalty duties owed to Dell and NVIDIA as well as the
companies' shareholders. And if the defendants knew or consciously avoided knowing that
the disclosures constituted violations of Regulation FD, and/or flagrantly contravened
compliance procedures at Dell and NVIDIA, then their knowledge of those breaches of
loyalty would support their Rule 1 Ob-5 liability, regardless of the defendants' knowledge
of a personal benefit on the part of the insiders. In short, the Newman jury could have
reasonably concluded that experienced professionals in the securities industry must either
have known or consciously avoided knowing that a public company's quarterly-earnings
cannot be regularly made available other than through deliberate actions not taken in good
faith by corporate insiders who had been entrusted with that information. 
346
343. See id. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. c (Am. Law. Inst. 2006) ("[A]n agent may
reveal to law-enforcement authorities that the principal is committing or is about to commit a crime.").
344. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006).
345. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d
147, 153 (2d Cir. 2013)).
346. Although Professor Epstein disagrees with Newman's reasoning on the issue of tipper personal benefits,
he supports the decision's outcome in view of the court's conclusion that "there was no evidence in the record to
establish that the defendants knew they were trading on unauthorized information released in violation of the
fiduciary duties of insiders." Epstein, supra note 188, at 1482. However, under common law principles, the
defendants' awareness of Regulation FD would seemingly warrant the imposition of a constructive trust on the
profits generated from the use of Dell and NVIDIA's confidential information: the hedge fund managers could
not have reasonably believed that officers and directors of those companies had authorized their employees to
repeatedly and selectively disclose unreleased earnings and other market-sensitive information to securities
analysts.
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VII. ALTERNATE PATHS FORWARD
In view of Salman's uncontroverted facts, which involved gratuitous tips passed from
an investment banker to his older brother, the Supreme Court could affirm the Ninth Circuit
and disavow the Newman ruling, without any need to look beyond its prior statements in
the Dirks decision. Indeed, as the first part of this Article demonstrated, the Second
Circuit's decision to overturn the jury's finding on the personal benefit issue was based on
ostensible constraints that appear nowhere in Dirks itself. Specifically, Dirks did not limit
its "gifting" theory to disclosures that were made only in the context of a "meaningfully
close personal relationship." 34 7 And Dirks never conditioned application of its gifting
theory on a showing that the tipper must have sought or expected some form of pecuniary
exchange or other tangible benefit from the recipient. Instead, as the Ninth Circuit
emphasized, Dirks was explicit in recognizing that "' [t]he elements of fiduciary duty and
exploitation of nonpublic information [ ] exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential
information to a trading relative or friend.', 34 8 Accordingly, under Dirks, it is irrelevant
whether the tippee is a beloved older brother, a best friend from college, a former business
school classmate and colleague, or a family friend from church. If the "purpose of the
disclosure" 349 was to enable the recipient to benefit from the principal's information, the
fiduciary's purpose was indisputably "improper," 350 and the fiduciary's disclosure would
have constituted a breach of duty under Dirks. And as a co-participant in the tipper's breach
of duty, the beneficiaries of those tips would have inherited the insider's Rule lOb-5
disclosure obligation to shareholders if "the tippee knows or should know that there has
been a breach.,
35 1
However, the Court in Salman now has before it the very same type of choice that the
Court confronted more than 33 years ago. That is, Justice Powell viewed Dirks to be an
"'easy' case. 352 Justice Powell, however, wanted to do more than simply vacate the
censure of the investment analyst who had advised clients to trade securities on the basis
of nonpublic information provided by a corporate whistleblower. 353 As Justice Powell
explained to his colleagues on the Court, "'[d]eciding this case without identifying a
general principle would accomplish very little."' 354 The Justices in Salman could likewise
limit themselves to a narrow ruling on Salman's easy facts. 355 But the Court could
347. Id.
348. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646,
664 (1983)).
349. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664.
350. Id. at 659.
351. Id. at660.
352. See Pritchard, supra note 34, at 862 n.25 (quoting handwritten notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
353. See id. at 863.
354. See id. (quoting Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Memorandum for Conference, Dirks v. SEC).
355. There was never a dispute in Salman as to whether the two brothers had a "meaningfully close personal
relationship." Thus, that part of the Newman holding is not, at least theoretically, presented to the Court for review.
See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 134 (quoting question presented in Salman's petition for certiorari). A short
opinion by the Court simply affirming the Ninth Circuit, therefore, would not necessarily undercut the
"meaningful relationship" part of Newman's heightened standard. Although the "tangible benefit" part of
Newman's holding has proven to be the more difficult hurdle for the government to scale, the "meaningfully close
personal relationship" prong has presented some difficulty as well. See In the Matter of Joseph C. Ruggieri,
Admin. Proceedings Ruling Release No. 3-16178 (Sept. 14, 2015),
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accomplish so much more by identifying "a general principle" that would govern in
subsequent insider trading cases, perhaps for decades to come.
For the reasons discussed below, the Salman Court should seize this opportunity to
make insider trading law substantially more coherent and legitimate. The first Section
raises tipping scenarios that are motivated by something other than a tipper's desire to
enrich either himself, a friend, or a relative. In such scenarios, the spirit of Dirks and the
letter of O'Hagan would be satisfied with a liability test that turns on a tipper's deceptive
breach of a fiduciary duty of loyalty, whether or not the tipper received a personal benefit
in exchange for the information. Thus, were the Court to follow this path, it could act
modestly in clarifying joint tipper-tippee liability by focusing on breaches of loyalty in
both classical and misappropriation theory contexts. The second Section explores how the
Court can use the Salman case to re-conceptualize insider trading law more generally.
Although fiduciary principles should have a substantial role in Rule 1 Ob-5's insider trading
and tipping prohibitions, the crux of the offenses involve defrauding investors by trading
on information that was obtained wrongfully, regardless of whether the trader or the tipper
violated a fiduciary duty owed to the issuer or the source of the information.
A. Joint Tipper-Tippee Liability Premised on Deceptive Breaches of Loyalty
The Court in Salman could clarify insider trading law considerably by delineating the
specific duty that a tipper must breach in order for a tippee to owe a disclosure obligation
under Rule lOb-5, either to the issuer's shareholders (in classical cases involving corporate
insiders) or to the source of the information (in misappropriation cases involving fiduciary
outsiders). Dirks makes a host of general references to "fiduciary" duties or breaches. 356
But these open-ended phrases, in conjunction with the Court's more explicit references to
"personal gain," 357 have left some scholars convinced that Dirks was focused entirely on
a fiduciary's duty to refrain from direct or indirect self-dealing. 358 And under such a
reading of Dirks, many indisputably deceptive breaches of the duty of loyalty would not
amount to illegal tipping--even when a tipper knew full well that the information he
disclosed would be used to advantage some traders over others in the securities markets.
It is precisely here that O'Hagan's depiction of the Rule 1 Ob-5 disclosure duty holds
more promise. Because O'Hagan views a fiduciary's misappropriation as a betrayal that
deprives the principal "of the exclusive use of [its] information," 359 under either the
classical or the misappropriation theory, the insider trading prohibition could extend to any
deceptive breach of the fiduciary's duty of loyalty, insofar as the breach involves a secret
https://www.sec.gov/alj/aljdec/2015/id877jsp.pdf (applying Newman and concluding that while the tipper was
"friends" with the tippee, "the evidence fails to establish that Bolan and Ruggieri's 'friendship' was meaningful,
close, or personal").
356. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654-56, 659-660, 662, 664-67 (1983).
357. Id. at 659, 662, 666 n.27.
358. See Bainbridge, supra note 315, at 1200 (concluding that Dirks should be read as imposing a "duty to
refrain from self-dealing in nonpublic information"); id. at 1201 ("[A] duty to disclose before trading arises only
if trading would violate a duty to refrain from self-dealing in confidential information owed by the trader to the
owner of that information."); see also Pritchard, supra note 34, at 874 ("Giving away corporate information to
strangers might make you feel like a big shot, but the standard is self-dealing: the gift needs to be an indirect
personal benefit, which suggests a close relationship, not a casual one.").
359. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 643, 652 (1997).
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disclosure of information that is shared with others for securities trading purposes.
360
Moreover, reading O'Hagan to encompass such secret and disloyal breaches gives effect
to important changes in state corporate law: breaches of loyalty are no longer limited to
instances of self-dealing or other conflicting interests; they can also be shown when a
fiduciary deliberately fails to act in good faith.
36 1
Consider, for example, an imaginative scenario posited by Professor James Cox that
involves an employee who, "like a modem day Paul Revere," rides through a town sharing
highly confidential good news in advance of a major press conference planned by his
corporate employer. There should be no doubt that a fiduciary who deliberately makes
such disclosures would be failing to act in good faith and would be breaching his duty of
loyalty; 363 and if he feigned fidelity to his employer after his ride was complete, he would
be doing so deceptively (at least until the employer learned of his antics). If this employee
were acting to facilitate securities trading by the townspeople, or if the townspeople's
securities trading was clearly foreseeable, he would have engaged in conduct that
constituted tipping-even if those tips were being disseminated to complete strangers with
absolutely nothing sought or expected by the employee in return. 364 In view of his
deceptive lack of good faith, and in light of O'Hagan's concerns about market integrity
and investor confidence, 365 that employee could be held liable for illegal tipping under
Rule lOb-5. As Delaware Chief Justice Strine has emphasized, "the reason for the
disloyalty (the faithlessness) is irrelevant, the underlying motive (be it venal, familial,
collegial, or nihilistic) for conscious action not in the corporation's best interest does not
make it faithful, as opposed to faithless." 366 Justices Blackmun and Marshall made
essentially that same point in Dirks when they criticized the majority for engrafting "a
special motivational requirement on the fiduciary duty doctrine.
3 67
Moreover, under a test for joint tipper-tippee liability that turned on the tipper's
deceptive breach of loyalty, some of the townspeople who traded securities based on the
employee's disclosures could be liable under Rule lOb-5 as well. As the Court outlined in
Dirks, their liability would depend on "what they knew or should have known" regarding
the employee's breach of loyalty. If they knew or should have known that the employee
deliberately failed to act in good faith in violation of a loyalty obligation owed to his
360. Cf. James J. Park, Rule 10b-5 and the Rise of the Unjust Enrichment Principle, 60 DUKE L.J. 345, 409
(2010) ("[T]he Supreme Court's decision in O'Hagan suggests a doctrinal foundation that can be modified so
that a workable Rule lOb-5 unjust enrichment principle can continue to develop.").
361. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006).
362. Cox, supra note 38.
363. See id. (contending that this modem day Revere would have breached "his state law fiduciary
relationship" and that his corporate employer "would be able to hold him financially accountable under orthodox
agency principles").
364. In his critique of the Newman opinion, Professor Prichard contends that for a gift of information to
constitute illegal tipping, "the gift needs to be exploitation, not waste (the corporate law term for a hypothetical
gift to a stranger)." Pritchard, supra note 34, at 874. But if the Court in Salman were to make it explicit that
breaches of the duty of loyalty in connection with securities trading create a disclosure obligation for purposes of
Rule IOb-5, then the employee's tips to strangers would violate Rule 1Ob-5. Cf. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'd, 906 A.2d 27, 75 (Del. 2006) ("The Delaware Supreme Court has
implicitly held that committing waste is an act of bad faith.").
365. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (quoting O'Hagan).
366. Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003).
367. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 668 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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employer to keep corporate secrets, then a claim under Rule 1 Ob-5 could be stated against
the townspeople for their illegal trading, assuming the SEC could prove scienter. Placing
the test for liability on a tippee's knowledge of the tipper's breach of loyalty, rather than
on knowledge of the tipper's personal benefit, provides the "objective criteria" that the
Court had been seeking in Dirks.368
A less imaginative scenario, but a far more realistic one, would involve an investor-
relations official at a publicly traded company. Assume that the official causes the company
to violate Regulation FD by intentionally or recklessly disclosing material nonpublic
information to the investment manager of a holder of the company's securities, "under
circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that the person will [trade] the issuer's
securities on the basis of the information." 369 Suppose, for instance, the official was
operating under a misguided view that such selective disclosure was in the company's best
interest-perhaps because the holder was a valued institutional investor that owned a
substantial amount of the company's shares. Under the Stone decision, the official's
"intent[ion] to violate applicable positive law" would constitute a deliberate failure to act
in good faith and thus a breach of her duty of loyalty. 370 And under O'Hagan, if the official
kept her violations of Regulation FD secret from the company, she would be "feign[ing]
fidelity." 37 1 The official's selective disclosures to the investment manager could therefore
constitute illegal tipping under Rule lOb-5, even if the investment manager had been a
mere casual acquaintance or a complete stranger. 372 Once again, the personal motivation
behind the investor-relations official's deliberate actions in violation of Regulation FD
would be irrelevant to the question of whether her intentional leaks of confidential
information constituted a breach of her duty of loyalty. 373
A remaining question concerns the investment manager-tippee, who clearly traded on
material nonpublic information that "ha[d] been made available to [the manager]
368. Id. at 670; see Pritchard, supra note 34, at 865 (contending that it was Justice O'Connor who convinced
Justice Powell to incorporate the requirement of a tipper's personal benefit, which alleviated the need for a
'tippee to 'predict' what is going on in the mind of his tipper').
369. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(iv) (2011).
370. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (quoting In re Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 76 (Del. 2006)).
371. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997).
372. Moreover, even if some supervising officials at a publicly traded company were to condone selective
disclosures notwithstanding the firm's compliance policies and the firm's regulatory obligations under Regulation
FD, the firm itself is still deserving of a loyalty obligation from its agent-and to foreclose a finding of deception,
full disclosure would have to be made to the firm. See Guttentag, supra note 305, at 49 (concluding that even if
an insider's tips do not deceive an immediate principal who may have sanctioned selective disclosures, such tips
would deceive "the firm which has adopted a policy prohibiting such behavior").
373. If the Salman Court were to reformulate the test for joint tipper-tippee liability to focus explicitly on a
tipper's deceptive breach of the duty of loyalty, then the SEC would almost certainly be prompted to reconsider-
and to retract-prior positions taken with respect to the effect of Regulation FD violations. Indeed, when it
initially proposed Regulation FD, the SEC'expressly disclaimed any intent to "treat selective disclosure as a type
of fraudulent conduct or revisit the insider trading issues addressed in Dirks." See Selective Disclosure and Insider
Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 34- 42259 [1999-2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,228,
at 82,860 (Dec. 20, 1999). The SEC's position, however, was predicated on the view that Dirks required a personal
benefit on the part of the tipper for a selective disclosure to be illegal, id., which was itself a function of a pre-
Stone, pre-Disney notion that the duty of loyalty encompassed little more than an obligation to avoid self-dealing.
See supra text accompanying notes 325-40.
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improperly." 374 As the beneficiary of the official's intentional selective disclosures in
violation of Regulation FD, the manager's investment funds could reap tremendous gains,
as did the hedge funds managed by the defendants in Newman. 375 Because all investment
managers are well aware of the prohibition of selective disclosure under Regulation FD,
that manager either knew or recklessly disregarded that the investor-relations official had
breached a duty of loyalty that she owed to the company to comply with "applicable
positive law."'376 Here again, the manager's awareness (or willful ignorance) that the tip
emanated from a violation of federal securities law provides a court with "objective
criteria" similar to the type that Dirks sought with its personal benefit test.377 Thus,
consistent with O'Hagan's policy objectives, and in view of the clarity of the Regulation
FD violation at issue, the government would be justified in pursuing a Rule 1 Ob-5 claim
against the manager for illegally trading on the basis of selectively disclosed information.
As a co-participant in the official's deceptive breach of a loyalty duty owed to the
shareholders of the company, the manager would likewise be violating Rule 1Ob-5 in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities.
378
In short, O'Hagan advanced insider trading law considerably by stating explicitly that
a loyalty duty is breached when fiduciaries misappropriate material nonpublic information
and deprive their principals of the exclusive use and control over such information. The
Salman Court now has the opportunity to advance the law even further by holding
explicitly that breaches of loyalty in connection with securities trading trigger for tippers a
Rule 1 Ob-5 disclosure obligation, and that tippees inherit that obligation when they know
or should know that the tipper has deliberately failed to act in good faith by conveying
entrusted information. A desire for personal gain--or for a gain by one's friend or
relative-may well be the most common explanation for tipping, whether by corporate
insiders or fiduciary outsiders. But other conscious failuresto act in good faith can facilitate
stock trading tips, and to paraphrase O'Hagan again, it would make "scant sense to hold [a
tipper] a § 10(b) violator if he" engaged in a quid pro quo or gratuitous tipping, but not if
he consciously failed to act in good faith byproviding a trading advantage to a third-party
acquaintance or even a complete stranger..79
B. Insider Trading Based on a "Fraud on Contemporaneous Traders"
As the foregoing has demonstrated, O'Hagan's "fraud on the source"
misappropriation theory plugged most of the insider trading gaps left open by Chiarella
and Dirks's classical theory, and a clear statement from the Salman Court that joint tipper-
374. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983).
375. See supra text accompanying note 58 (observing that Newman's stock trading generated more than $4
million in profits for the funds he managed and Chiasson's funds reaped profits exceeding $68 million).
376. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (quoting In re Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 76 (Del. 2006)).
377. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983); see supra text accompanying note 188 (comparing awareness
about misappropriated information to awareness about other types of stolen property).
378. Professor Guttentag takes this conclusion even farther and argues that, in view of Regulation FD and
the internal compliance policies adopted by publicly traded firms to protect the confidentiality of market-sensitive
information, courts should "create a rebuttable presumption that repeated selective access to material nonpublic
information indicates that deceptive conduct is occurring." See Guttentag, supra note 305, at 32.
379. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 659 (1997).
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tippee liability turns on deceptive breaches of loyalty (irrespective of a personal benefit)
would plug other troubling gaps, including the gap that now exists for many instances of
trading on selective disclosures that were deliberately leaked in violation of Regulation
FD. But the insider trading and tipping prohibitions arising under Rule 1 Ob-5 have not yet
been construed broadly enough to encompass a number of additional instances of securities
trading on the basis of material nonpublic information that has been obtained wrongfully.
Securities trading on the basis of stolen information, for instance, may involve neither a
fiduciary breach nor active deception, and thus only some computer hackers who trade
securities and/or tip others to trade will be found liable under Rule 1 Ob-5. 380 Moreover, as
the Court itself acknowledged in O'Hagan, its misappropriation theory does not extend to
a fiduciary who brazenly discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic
information, or where the source is otherwise aware that a breach of loyalty is occurring.
381
Securities trading by non-fiduciary thieves (such as computer hackers) or brazen fiduciaries
(such as an employee who discloses an intention to trade, and then quits) undermines
investor confidence and compromises market integrity to the same extent as the self-
serving use of the source's information by its agents or other fiduciaries. 3 82 To be sure, the
"fraud on the source" theory was entirely adequate for the purpose of reinstating
O'Hagan's Rule 1Ob-5 conviction, and the government "[did] not propose ... a theory of
that breadth." 383 But the Court's observation that "§ 10(b) is only a partial antidote to the
problems it was designed to alleviate" 384 need not come to pass if the text of Section 10(b)
and Rule 1 Ob-5 support a broader insider trading theory that encompasses other instances
of securities trading on wrongfully obtained information that fall outside of the Court's
"deception by a fiduciary" paradigm.
In his dissenting opinion in Chiarella v. United States,385 Chief Justice Burger
articulated a workable "fraud on contemporaneous traders" theory of insider trading
liability that would extend Rule 1 Ob-5 to a litany of instances involving tips and trades that
currently fit into neither the classical nor the misappropriation theory. The Chief Justice's
380. See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009). The court in Dorozhko was of the view that no
breach of duty was necessary because "misrepresenting one's identity in order to gain access to information that
is otherwise off limits, and then stealing that information is plainly 'deceptive."' Id. But the court raised a question
as to whether exploiting a weakness in an electronic code to gain unauthorized access would involve active
deception or "mere[ly] theft." Id.; see also Noeleen Walder et al., Hackers stole secrets for up to $100 million
insider-trading profit: U.S., REUTERS (Aug. 12, 2015, 5:05 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
cybercybersecurity-hacking-stocks-arr-idUSKCNOQG1EY20150812; Andrew N. Vollmer, Computer Hacking
and Securities Fraud, 47 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1985 (Oct. 19, 2015) (contending that the ring of traders "engaged
in no deceit at all" and that the actions by the hacker-tippers "were steps away from a deception coinciding with
a securities trade").
381. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655-56.
382. See Nagy, Fiduciary Principles, supra note 47, at 1336 (contending that the Court in O'Hagan would
have served its "policy goals far better had it not endorsed a theory predicated entirely on a fiduciary relationship
between the source and the trader"); Nagy, Reframing Misappropriation, supra note 47, at 1274 (contending that
O'Hagan's fraud-on-the-source version of the misappropriation theory is "under-inclusive in that it fails to
prohibit a whole variety of securities transactions based on misappropriated information that, under the majority's
rationale, would be as unfair to investors and as harmful to securities markets as the particular trading
accomplished by O'Hagan").
383. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655 n.6.
384. Id. at 661 n.9.
385. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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theory, which was rooted in the Government's brief,386 focused the Rule 1Ob-5 analysis on
the propriety of a trader's silence about material nonpublic information in a securities
transaction. Although he agreed with the majority that generally "neither party to an arm's-
length business transaction has an obligation to disclose information to the other unless the
parties stand in some confidential or fiduciary relation," 387 the Chief Justice believed that
the policies that underlie that general rule "should limit its scope" and that the common
law rule of caveat emptor should in particular "give way when an informational advantage
is obtained, not by superior experience, foresight, or industry, but by some unlawful
means."
388
Accordingly, the Chief Justice would have read "§ 10(b) and Rule 1 Ob-5 to encompass
and build from this principle: a person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has
an absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from trading.' 389 The key support
from the common law was the precedent in the British case of Phillips v. Homfray,390
involving a real estate transaction in which the buyer obtained an informational advantage
through an illegal trespass on the seller's property. The Homfray court refused to order
specific performance of the contract, reasoning that the trespassing buyer's non-disclosure
of material information pertaining to valuable mineral deposits amounted to a
misrepresentation. In other words, the general rule of caveat emptor/vendor "gave way"
when the informationally advantaged party employed an illegitimate "mode of acquiring
knowledge."'
39 1
Although Chief Justice Burger did not explicitly describe his theory as such, because
he had postulated a disclosure duty that ran to the shareholders on the opposite side of the
securities transaction, the Rule lOb-5 violation that he contemplated would have resulted
in a "fraud on contemporaneous traders."' 392 Corporate insiders or other persons who
communicate misappropriated or otherwise wrongfully obtained information to facilitate
securities trading would likewise be violating Rule lOb-5 as a co-participant in the trader's
386. See Brief of Respondent United States at 39-43, Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1979) (No.
78-1202), 1979 WL 199454.
387. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 239-40 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
388. Id. at 240 (quoting Page W. Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEx. L. REV. 1, 25-
26 (1936)) (observing that "'[a]ny time information is acquired by an illegal act it would seem that there should
be a duty to disclose that information."').
389. Id.; see Donald C. Langevoort, Words from on High about Rule J0b-5: Chiarella's History, Central
Bank's Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 883-84 (1995) (favorably critiquing Chief Justice Burger's dissent in
Chiarella and advocating judicial recognition of a misappropriation theory premised on the fraud that is
perpetrated on other marketplace traders).
390. Phillips v. Homfray (1871), 6 Ch. App. 770 (Eng.) (discussed in Brief of Respondent United States,
supra note 387, at 41).
391. Homfray, 6 Ch. App at 780; see also Mallon Oil Co. v. Bowen/Edwards Assoc., 965 P.2d 105, 112
(Colo. 1998) (recognizing an exception to the rule ofnondisclosure "when the buyer acquires [information about
oil and gas reserves] ... through improper means, such as trespass" (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 161 illus. 11 (Am. Law Inst. 1981))).
392. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240-45 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Along with the Chief
Justice, Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Marshall supported the recognition of an exception to the general
principle of caveat emptor. See id. 238-39 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (endorsing a broad
misappropriation theory, but agreeing with the majority that misappropriation instructions had not been presented
to the jury); id. at 245-46 (Blackmun, J, joined by Marshall, J., dissenting) (endorsing a more expansive parity of
information approach, but observing that Chiarella's trading on misappropriated confidential information "is the
most dramatic evidence that [he] was guilty of fraud").
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fraud. The notion that contemporaneous traders are wronged by persons trading on
misappropriated information is also what prompted Congress to provide the express private
right of action in Section 20A of the Exchange Act. 
393
Support for the consolidation of the classical and misappropriation approaches into a
unified and expanded theory can also be drawn from O'Hagan itself, as well as from the
Court's more recent decision in Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice.394 As Justice
Ginsburg underscored in O'Hagan, the federal insider trading prohibition arising under
Section 10(b) and Rule 1 Ob-5 is directed at conduct that "undermines the integrity of, and
investor confidence in, the securities markets." 395 And while under the Court's view it was
a breach of loyalty that triggered that particular defendant's Rule 1Ob-5 disclosure
obligation to the source of the information, Justice Ginsburg also emphasized that
O'Hagan's fraud on the source "simultaneously harm[ed] members of the investing
public." 39 6 In Troice, Justice Breyer not only reiterated O'Hagan's view that an insider
trader's "victims [are] 'members of the investing public' harmed by the defendant's gaining
of an 'advantageous market position' through insider trading." But he also went further
to categorize O'Hagan as a decision involving deception "that was 'material' to another
individual's decision to 'purchase or sell' a statutorily defined 'security"' and in which
"the relevant statements or omissions were material to a transaction in the relevant
securities by or on behalf of someone other than the fraudster." 398 Justice Breyer's
placement of O'Hagan within this line of "in connection with" cases may have
foreshadowed a recognition on the part of the Court that investors trading opposite to a
misappropriator are not only "harmed" and "victimized" but also deceived and defrauded
in violation of Rule lOb-5.
My purpose in restating this "fraud on contemporaneous traders" theory is not to once
again set out the research and arguments that I have discussed extensively elsewhere; 399 it
is rather to underscore the advantages of a path that would consolidate the classical and
misappropriation approaches into a unified and expanded insider trading theory. This
"fraud on contemporaneous traders" theory would turn on whether a securities trader, with
scienter, used wrongfully obtained information in a securities transaction. A
reconceptualization such as this would be warranted now-even if it were not in
O'Hagan-because in the 19 years since that decision, the complementary liability theories
393. See supra text accompanying notes 246-250 (discussing ITSFEA).
394. Chadboume & Parke LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058 (2014).
395. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 641, 658 (1997).
396. Id. at 656.
397. Chadboume & Park LLP v Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058, 1067 (2014) (quoting O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656).
At issue in Troice was whether state law claims brought by the plaintiffs in state court were preempted by a
provision in the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, which limited the provision to cases in which
plaintiffs allege a "misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a
covered security." Id. at 1064 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)). The Court looked to Rule lOb-5's "in connection
with" requirement to assist its task of interpreting the identical language in SLUSA. Id. at 1066.
398. Id. at 1069 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). But see id. at 1077 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(quoting O'Hagan and questioning the view that the securities fraud at issue in O 'Hagan related to an investment
decision, and highlighting O 'Hagan's holding that the attorney-defendant's securities transactions deceived and
defrauded his law firm and their client, notwithstanding that neither had the status of an "identifiable purchaser
or seller" of securities).
399. See Nagy, Refraining Misappropriation, supra note 47, at 1287-1310; Nagy, Fiduciary Principles,
supra note 47, at 1373-78.
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for classical insiders and misappropriating outsiders have resulted in an insider trading
jurisprudence that is unnecessarily complex. 40 0 Thus, a choice by the Salman Court to
narrowly address the central issue of gratuitous tipping or to follow a path that merely
clarifies joint tipper-tippee liability would be a lost opportunity.
A unified and expanded theory of insider trading that incorporates Chiarella, Dirks,
and O'Hagan's fiduciary principles-but would not be cabined by them-would have
much to commend it. Lower courts would no longer feel obliged to stretch fiduciary
principles beyond recognition, as courts have done in dozens of cases that fall outside of
fiduciary parameters but nonetheless involved securities trading on wrongfully obtained
information. 40 1 A "fraud on contemporaneous traders" theory would, for example, be a
better fit for securities trading by information thieves (such as computer hackers) who are
strangers to the source of the stolen information 4 02 as well as to brazen fiduciaries (and
their tippees) who trade with disclosure, but not with permission from the source. 4 03 In
addition, the theory would extend to securities traders who knowingly or recklessly trade
securities on the basis of material nonpublic information that has been selectively disclosed
by corporate insiders in violation of Regulation FD, even if some of the issuer's executives
had condoned those disclosures. 40 4 However, because a "fraud on contemporaneous
traders" theory is triggered only by wrongful conduct that results in informational
asymmetries, securities traders would still be able to capitalize on informational advantages
obtained through legitimate searches for information and diligent research.
If the Salman Court were to embark down this path, its starting place, of course, would
be with Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5's text. That is, the Court would explain why Salman's
conduct constituted deception in connection with the purchase or sale of securities: Salman
defrauded the investors with whom he was trading when he remained silent about material
nonpublic information that he knew or was reckless in not knowing had been
misappropriated from an investment bank and its clients by his brother-in-law, Maher.
40 5
And Maher's guilty plea for securities fraud was clearly warranted because, as the original
tipper who improperly disclosed his employer's and its client's confidential
information, 4 06 Maher was a co-participant in Salman's fraud on contemporaneous traders.
In addition, the Salman Court could explain that in framing the deception at issue as a
"fraud on contemporaneous traders," the theory prohibits precisely the type of fraudulent
conduct vis-a-vis investors that Congress intended Section 10(b) to reach. 4 07 The Court
400. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (quoting observations by Professors Henning and Hazen).
401. See Nagy, Fiduciary Principles, supra note 47, at 1361-62 (charting the gradual demise of fiduciary
principles in insider trading decisions by lower federal courts, settled enforcement proceedings, and rules adopted
by the SEC).
402. See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009) (remanding case to determine whether computer
hacking involved active deception).
403. See SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2006) (observing that a corporate executive's wife's
disclosure that she intended to give her brother a "gift of information" negated a finding that her tipping was
deceitful; but holding that the SEC stated a claim because the wife deceived her husband in her acquisition of that
information).
404. See supra note 372 (quoting Professor Guttentag).
405. See United States. v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2015).
406. Id.
407. See Nagy, Fiduciary Principles, supra note 47, at 1361; Nagy, ReframingMisappropriation, supra note
47, at 1301-03.
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could likewise relate this unified and expanded theory of insider trading to its recent
decision in Troice, and specifically to its recognition that a fraud occurs "in connection
with" a securities transaction only if that fraud is "'material' to another individual's
decision to 'purchase or s[ell]' a statutorily defined 'security.'408
To assist lower courts in applying a Rule 1Ob-5 insider trading prohibition based on a
fraud on contemporaneous traders, the Salman Court could also provide "guiding
principles." The Court's greatest challenge would be in defining the scope of the wrongful
conduct that would trigger the disclosure duty in a securities transaction. But the Court
could seize upon general categories of wrongful conduct such as illegal acts (e.g., theft and
bribery), tortious acts (e.g., deceit, conversion, trespass, or invasions of privacy), fiduciary
breaches of loyalty, and breaches of confidentiality agreements. 409 Ultimately, however,
the "fraud on contemporaneous traders" path would continue to develop through DOJ and
SEC enforcement actions and in decisions by lower federal courts, but the greater
uniformity and legitimacy from a unified and expanded theory would facilitate that
development considerably.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court did not have insider trading especially in mind when it famously
observed that a "peculiar blend of legislative, administrative, and judicial history...
surrounds Rule 1Ob-5. ' '410 Nevertheless, that observation fits the development of insider
trading jurisprudence to a T. The federal insider trading and tipping prohibitions that arise
under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 reflect a unique collaboration dating back to the SEC's
1961 administrative order in Cady, Roberts, and continuing to the present with the Supreme
Court's imminent decision in Salman v. United States.
As this Article recounts, the federal prohibitions of insider trading and tipping
extended their farthest with the parity of information approach developed in Cady, Roberts
and Texas Gulf Sulphur. But in the early 1980s, Chiarella and Dirks refused to recognize
such a broad-based duty to forgo trading on material nonpublic information and narrowly
premised the necessary disclosure obligation on a fiduciary relationship between the parties
to the securities transaction. Then, in 1997, O'Hagan substantially expanded the insider
trading prohibition to include undisclosed misappropriations of material nonpublic
information by securities traders who owe duties of loyalty to an information's source. And
in 2000, the SEC's concerns with informational asymmetries carried the day once again
through Regulation FD's ban on selective disclosure, which unmoors certain types of
tipping from the construct of fraud by imposing regulatory constraints on publicly traded
securities issuers and their officials. Keenly aware of its own essential role in the
collaboration, Congress passed insider trading legislation on two occasions soon after
Dirks, and again more recently, with the STOCK Act. At each legislative juncture,
Congress's support for insider trading and tipping prohibitions arising under Section 10(b)
and Rule I Ob-5 has been constant and unequivocal.
The Court's decision in Salman constitutes the next chapter in this peculiar blend of
408. Chadbourne & Park LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058, 1069 (2014); see also supra text accompanying
note 398.
409. Nagy, Fiduciary Principles, supra note 47, at 1377-78.
410. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975).
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history. Looking beyond Dirks in tipper-tippee insider trading cases appropriately credits
the profound changes effectuated by all three branches of the federal government and
recognizes important changes in state law that bear on federal disclosure duties under Rule
lOb-5. These post-Dirks developments have paved the way for a clearer doctrine of joint
tipper-tippee liability that turns on whether a tipper has breached a duty of loyalty to the
source of material nonpublic information, whether or not the tipper conveyed the
information for personal gain.
But the Salman case presents an opportunity for the Court to re-conceptualize insider
trading jurisprudence more generally-to render it more coherent and legitimate as well as
better aligned with Congress's and the SEC's policy goals of promoting market integrity
and investor confidence. The Court should clarify the law and better serve these objectives
by consolidating its prior classical and misappropriation approaches into a new "fraud on
contemporaneous traders" theory. Under this unified and expanded framework, a Rule lOb-
5 violation would occur when a person knowingly or recklessly uses wrongfully obtained
material nonpublic information in connection with a securities transaction, or wrongfully
communicates such information, regardless of whether the trader or tipper violated a
fiduciary duty that was owed to the shareholders of the issuer or the source of the
information.

